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>> DAVID MALAN: All right, welcome back.

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This is CS50, and this is
the start of week 10.

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So, for the past several weeks, we've
been looking at a fairly low level how

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the internet works.

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TCP/IP, HTTP, the language [? top ?]
which we've begun to build interesting

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things in languages like HTML, CSS,
PHP, and most recently JavaScript.

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>> Today, though, we're joined by Jonathan
Zittrain, a professor at

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Harvard Law School, at Harvard Kennedy
School, and the Harvard School of

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Engineering and Applied Sciences, who
most recently taught a course called

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Computer Science 42, Controlling
Cyberspace.

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Today, we are poised to now look at a
much bigger picture, and undoubtedly a

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bit at how life, the universe, and
everything works, with our friend,

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professor Jonathan Zittrain.

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>> JONATHAN ZITTRAIN: Thank you,
David, and good afternoon.

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You are in an incredible
course, as you know.

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You are apprenticing to a set of
technologies that are really unusual,

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and I want to talk today about what
makes them so unusual, why we should

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care about it, and why they might be
evolving in the future in directions

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that we don't like.

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And possibly even what to do about it,
although I realize we have about 49

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minutes and 30 seconds yet, so
some corners may be cut.

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>> Maybe a framework to think about
this stuff is technologies

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as owned and unowned.

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And I want to explain what I
mean by owned and unowned.

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Most technology in the world is owned,
and I'll give a few examples of that.

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But the internet turns out to be an
unowned technology, and that can make

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all the difference.

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>> So here are some owned technologies.

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This is the IBM System/360.

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This was a serious computer back
in its day, and as you can see,

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everything about it radiates that you
had better not go anywhere near it.

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This is the kind of computer that sat
in the basement of a big company--

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an actuary, an insurance company, a
bank, or maybe a government tallying

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the census.

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And it was programmed, usually, by the
vendor who operated the machine, in

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this case IBM.

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And that's because, while it was a
general purpose computer, it could be

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programmed or reprogrammed, it was so
precious and delicate, and part of the

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business model of IBM was to keep
it apart from its consumer.

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>> You would instead tell IBM what you
wanted, and then they would go ahead

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and program it for you.

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Not a bad deal, but a very owned
technology in the sense that we know

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who is responsible for it, and whom to
blame if something goes wrong with it,

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and it means that we're not going to
get that surprised by it, because

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everybody is so careful about what
they use the computer for.

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Now, these are the sorts of
things that went into it.

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Those are, of course, old-fashioned
punch cards, and those represented,

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again, that you could program the
machine in any way that you wanted, so

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long as you could get near it, which
again, generally, you could not.

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>> This is another kind of technology
that is also owned.

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This is the Friden Flexowriter.

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And the Friden Flexowriter was like a
standard typewriter, and as you typed,

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the letters would appear on the paper,
but it would also make for little

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indentations in this tape
that ran through it.

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And the tape, if put back through the
typewriter like a player piano, would

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type out whatever had previously
been done.

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Which meant that with enough scissors
and glue, you could actually cut and

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paste your way to a mail merge
more easily than you can

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with Microsoft Word.

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>> So, the Flexowriter was very cool.

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It was very accessible.

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It doesn't threaten to electrocute
you if you go near it.

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But there's no place to put a punch
card to tell it what to do.

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The only punch technology is data.

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Type what you see, or it generates
that strip as you type.

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There's no code.

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There's only content with the
Flexowriter, and its successors are

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what the world of the 1980s and 1990s
was shaping up to be for information

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technology.

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>> This is the Brother Smart
Word Processor.

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You turn this thing on, this
is its home screen.

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Where would you like to go today?

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Word processing, spreadsheet,
et cetera, et cetera.

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And the way this thing worked on
Wednesday it was exactly the way it

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worked on Tuesday, and was the way
it was going to work until

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you got rid of it.

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It was not programmable.

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>> Again, it only dealt with data, and it's
an owned technology, because how

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it would act was very much an
artifact of what the Brother

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people put into it.

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Ditto, one might hope, for
a CAT scan machine.

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You want it to operate exactly as it
was designed, although they are

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slightly reprogrammable in
the IBM System/360 way.

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Again, we see some risks, some
unpleasant surprises that could come

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if you have the wrong people programming
your CAT scanner, as

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actually has happened in
the past few years.

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But now, part of this CAT scanner is a
little piece of what I would describe

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as an unowned technology
in the middle of it.

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And that is the personal computer.

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>> So let's look at the unowned technology
that got things started.

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This is Steve Jobs at the West Coast
Computer Faire in 1977, described as

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10,000 walking, talking
computer freaks.

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This was very marginal, but well
attended, and this was, for the first

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time in consumer hands, a
reprogrammable machine.

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You get your Apple II.

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You turn it on after hooking it up to,
yes, your television set, and you get

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a blinking cursor.

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And it's up to you to figure
out what to do.

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When you get the Apple II out of
the box, it is a door stop.

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It's only when you do such things
as 10, print hello.

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20, go to 10, that fun really begins.

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>> And you had lots and lots of people
stepping forward to program their

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personal computers, intended
as hobbyist machines.

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Within two years you had Dan Bricklin
and Bob Frankston of the Boston area,

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programming the first digital
spreadsheet ever, VisiCalc.

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And suddenly, businesses the nation
over were like, oh my god,

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spreadsheets.

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And they started buying
Apple II computers.

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They are flying off the shelves, and
Apple had to do market research to

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figure out why this thing
was so popular.

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>> That's what makes this an
unowned technology.

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You didn't buy it from Apple, but Apple
expects you or Bob Frankston or

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or somebody to program it later.

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And if your Apple doesn't spreadsheet
the way you want, it's not clear that

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it's Apple's fault.

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It is unowned in that it accepts
contributions from anybody with the

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moxie and skill to program it, who
can then share that program

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with anybody else.

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And that model became the model
for all that followed.

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>> This is Bill Gates two years after he
dropped out of Harvard, and he was

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pulled over for a traffic stop
in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

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You can see the fashion
was different then.

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And he does have a smile on his face,
somehow knowing that he can buy and

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sell us all someday.

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And he was able to take what Jobs did
and put it into, maybe, MS-DOS or

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later, Windows.

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>> But basically, this format, which is,
you give this thing code, it may start

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with the blinking cursor, but
then it will run the code.

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And that was true on many
PCs until recently.

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And it was true then.

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This thing is probably around 1992.

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I place it because of
the 66 light here.

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It had a button that could alternate
between 66 and 33, which was the speed

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at which the chip inside should run.

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You may wonder, why not leave
it fast all the time?

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That's because it would tire the
hamsters out inside if you made it run

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too quickly.

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And Prince of Persia would
be too fast as well.

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I see, by the way, they now have hamster
powered paper shredders.

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So you can put the paper in the top, and
then the hamster runs on the wheel

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and shreds the paper, and then can
live in the paper afterwards.

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So it's all part of the cycle of life.

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>> Anyway, these things can run any
code you give it, and that is a

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fundamental, but still contingent,
piece of the technology.

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It didn't have to be that way.

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It could have been the Brother Smart
Word Processor, and as people at

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Brother or their competitors invent new
stuff, they roll it out like any

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consumer product.

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It's not up to you to put a seventh
blade into your safety razor.

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We wait for Gillette to say, if
five is good, why not seven?

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And then we get it, and we buy it.

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>> This is different.

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With the modern PC revolution, for the
past 30 years, you hand a computer

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code that you have written or gotten
from somebody else, it

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will run the code.

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And that changes everything.

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That is what gave rise to the off the
shelf independent software movement.

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So you could buy a computer for any
purpose, and then use it for any

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number of other purposes.

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Or your brother could, or your
kid could, or anything else.

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>> It didn't have to be this way, but it
turned out to be this way, once

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everybody discovered how many
discoveries could come if you just

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released the technology blinking cursor
style and figured that the

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world would build cool stuff.

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So that's, to me, the essence of unowned
technologies, and I just want

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to emphasize that you don't
have to be this way.

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If you rewound time and played it back
again, it's not clear to me that we

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would end up with an unowned technology
at the core of our consumer

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computing experience.

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>> Now, on the network side, there
was a similar transformation.

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It began in the owned space.

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AT&T ran the long distance system,
and that was that, and it

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worked pretty well.

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And the prices were what they were,
and the regulators came

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in to set the prices.

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And AT&T purported to control
the whole network.

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So back in the early 20th century,
when an enterprising man invented

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this, the Hush-A-Phone, it was something
that would go over your

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telephone handset, so that your person
you were talking to wouldn't hear

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extraneous noise.

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And no one could hear what you were
saying to your interlocutor.

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AT&T said no, we must a license that,
because it could damage our network,

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and they purported to block
people using it.

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>> This is an era, by the way, in which the
telephones were leased from AT&T.

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You could not go to the store
and buy a telephone.

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You had to get it from your telephone
services provider.

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This went up and down the Federal
Communications Commission.

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The FCC backed up AT&T. It took a
Supreme Court decision, ultimately, to

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reverse that.

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And the world was free to have their
phone hushed, but not much else.

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>> That had its own successors.

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Back in the day-- and I now
mean probably the mid '80s

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into the early '90s--

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there were services like CompuServe.

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That was going to be the
future of networking.

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It had competitors, like Prodigy, and
AOL, and the source, and MCI Mail.

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But you basically paid by the month,
and then you got a rational menu of

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things you might want to do.

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Where you want to go today?

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>> But this menu was produced
by CompuServe.

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If there was going to be something new
on it, you'd get it from CompuServe.

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And if somebody out there was like,
I think there should be a VisiCalc

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button, you'd better persuade CompuServe
of its worth, or it would

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never be accessible to somebody
using the service.

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So that's an example of the IBM 360 or
the Flexowriter model of technology

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for networking.

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That gets blown out of the water,
unexpectedly to almost everybody in

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the field, by this academic research
network known as the internet.

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>> Here are three of the founders, pictured
here, of the internet--

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classmates, it turns out, at Van
Nuys High School in California.

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There's Jon Postel and Steve Crocker and
Vint Cerf, showing at their 25th

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anniversary retrospective picture for
Newsweek that you can build a network

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out of pretty much anything.

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Although, as you'll see, their
network doesn't work.

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It goes from his ear to his ear, and
mouth to mouth, which I hope is an

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inside joke, rather than the founders
of the internet don't know how to

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string tin cans together.

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But you can see that they built a
network because they didn't have a lot

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of money and couldn't roll it out
FedEx style, with lots of people

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working for them.

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And because they weren't intending to
make any money from it, they built a

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network that was unowned, whose points
would be respectively owned or

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operated by who knows who, and maybe
there would even be piggybacking.

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MIT would piggyback on BBN to get its
packets going back and forth.

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>> But unowned as a total thing-- what they
built were protocols to put the

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internet together in a way
that there was no CEO.

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00:13:43,000 --> 00:13:45,010
There was no main menu.

230
00:13:45,010 --> 00:13:46,670
It just is.

231
00:13:46,670 --> 00:13:50,150
And it's such an unusual way of doing
it, both in methodology and in

232
00:13:50,150 --> 00:13:53,560
substance, that for many years, IBM
was fond of saying you couldn't

233
00:13:53,560 --> 00:13:57,160
possibly build a corporate
network using TCP/IP.

234
00:13:57,160 --> 00:13:59,820
And that's why internet engineers say
that their mascot would be the

235
00:13:59,820 --> 00:14:03,850
bumblebee, because the fur to wingspan
ratio of the bumblebee is far too

236
00:14:03,850 --> 00:14:08,270
large for it to be able to fly, and
yet, miraculously, the bee flies.

237
00:14:08,270 --> 00:14:12,350
It turns out that we finally discovered
how bees fly in 2006,

238
00:14:12,350 --> 00:14:14,200
thanks to massive government funding.

239
00:14:14,200 --> 00:14:18,720
It turns out they flap their
wings very quickly.

240
00:14:18,720 --> 00:14:25,670
>> So the way the internet works is kind of
like the way the beer finds its way

241
00:14:25,670 --> 00:14:27,510
around in Fenway Park.

242
00:14:27,510 --> 00:14:33,470
Somebody asked for a beer, but there's
no beer distribution limit network

243
00:14:33,470 --> 00:14:35,560
down to the last foot or so.

244
00:14:35,560 --> 00:14:39,190
For that, the person has to hand the
beer to the toddler sitting on the

245
00:14:39,190 --> 00:14:40,970
end, who then passes it over.

246
00:14:40,970 --> 00:14:46,620
And at risk to each of our trousers, we
do this because we stand together

247
00:14:46,620 --> 00:14:49,070
to let the fun flow.

248
00:14:49,070 --> 00:14:52,690
And that's basically the way packet
networking works on the internet,

249
00:14:52,690 --> 00:14:56,270
where there are entities on the internet
handling your packets, as you

250
00:14:56,270 --> 00:14:59,750
get them relayed from one point to
another, who have no contractual

251
00:14:59,750 --> 00:15:03,260
relationship with you, nor with
the ultimate destination.

252
00:15:03,260 --> 00:15:07,850
It's like nested matryoshka
dolls, how it goes around.

253
00:15:07,850 --> 00:15:11,110
>> The basic format is this, and you may
have learned a little bit about it.

254
00:15:11,110 --> 00:15:14,740
It's called hourglass architecture,
and it says that you put not

255
00:15:14,740 --> 00:15:17,480
intellectual property, but internet
protocol, in the middle of the

256
00:15:17,480 --> 00:15:18,230
hourglass here.

257
00:15:18,230 --> 00:15:21,690
That's what the engineers work on,
and it's designed to be totally

258
00:15:21,690 --> 00:15:25,130
ecumenical, which is why it's broad
on the top and the bottom.

259
00:15:25,130 --> 00:15:30,670
At the top, we allow any
number of applications.

260
00:15:30,670 --> 00:15:32,650
Who knows what somebody's
going to build on it.

261
00:15:32,650 --> 00:15:34,650
It's just like a blinking cursor.

262
00:15:34,650 --> 00:15:38,060
>> The internet is just designed to take
points of presence and route packets

263
00:15:38,060 --> 00:15:39,990
between them using best efforts.

264
00:15:39,990 --> 00:15:41,316
That's it.

265
00:15:41,316 --> 00:15:42,140
That's It.

266
00:15:42,140 --> 00:15:44,210
It's not a set of applications.

267
00:15:44,210 --> 00:15:45,550
It's just the network.

268
00:15:45,550 --> 00:15:48,660
And then anybody can build applications
on top of it, and may the

269
00:15:48,660 --> 00:15:49,940
best apps win.

270
00:15:49,940 --> 00:15:52,630
And underneath, it was meant
to be ecumenical about what

271
00:15:52,630 --> 00:15:54,100
hardware you would use.

272
00:15:54,100 --> 00:15:56,260
Whatever hardware you
want to use, boom.

273
00:15:56,260 --> 00:15:59,970
You can bring it to the party, so long
as it speaks internet protocol.

274
00:15:59,970 --> 00:16:03,920
And there is no copyright asserted in
internet protocol, and as changes are

275
00:16:03,920 --> 00:16:07,130
made to it, you're free
to adopt them or not.

276
00:16:07,130 --> 00:16:11,080
As an equipment manufacturer or as a
network provider, it is, in fact, a

277
00:16:11,080 --> 00:16:15,780
collective hallucination, but a very
sustained and powerful one.

278
00:16:15,780 --> 00:16:18,930
>> And the idea was, don't make
the network smart.

279
00:16:18,930 --> 00:16:20,310
Don't keep adding features.

280
00:16:20,310 --> 00:16:24,120
Otherwise, we would be at the animated
paper clip phase of the internet.

281
00:16:24,120 --> 00:16:28,160
We are not, because we never
added many features to it.

282
00:16:28,160 --> 00:16:32,460
Instead, it's just supposed to
route and let the endpoints--

283
00:16:32,460 --> 00:16:35,290
the smart things on the end like PCs--

284
00:16:35,290 --> 00:16:40,670
deal with any features they want, such
as encryption, such as return receipt,

285
00:16:40,670 --> 00:16:44,890
all of that stuff meant to
be only if you need them.

286
00:16:44,890 --> 00:16:48,390
>> Now a different David-- that was David
Clark who contributed to last paper--

287
00:16:48,390 --> 00:16:51,720
a different Clarke, Arthur C.
Clarke, came up with what he

288
00:16:51,720 --> 00:16:53,260
calls his Third Law.

289
00:16:53,260 --> 00:16:56,680
And this was, "Any sufficiently
advanced technology is

290
00:16:56,680 --> 00:17:02,390
indistinguishable from magic." He was
actually borrowing from a previous

291
00:17:02,390 --> 00:17:05,329
science fiction writer, Leigh
Brackett, who put it

292
00:17:05,329 --> 00:17:06,990
a little less kindly.

293
00:17:06,990 --> 00:17:08,650
"Witchcraft to the ignorant--

294
00:17:08,650 --> 00:17:10,950
simple science to the learned."

295
00:17:10,950 --> 00:17:16,230
>> And I put it to you that part of CS50
is to move you from one category to

296
00:17:16,230 --> 00:17:20,000
the other, so that you can start
understanding stuff that seems like

297
00:17:20,000 --> 00:17:20,930
magic to others.

298
00:17:20,930 --> 00:17:25,030
I turn on my Flexowriter, and magically,
it pounds out a paper that

299
00:17:25,030 --> 00:17:26,859
I had previously recorded.

300
00:17:26,859 --> 00:17:29,780
You're learning about the
guts of technology.

301
00:17:29,780 --> 00:17:33,970
And these are unowned technologies,
both at the endpoint and in the

302
00:17:33,970 --> 00:17:37,480
network, that let you take what you've
learned and just take it for a spin.

303
00:17:37,480 --> 00:17:38,220
Try it out.

304
00:17:38,220 --> 00:17:41,230
See if you can change the
world in some way.

305
00:17:41,230 --> 00:17:45,150
And it will look like magic to others,
but you are learning the secrets to

306
00:17:45,150 --> 00:17:48,420
make it simple science.

307
00:17:48,420 --> 00:17:52,640
>> One such person who did this to the
nth degree is Sir Tim Berners-Lee.

308
00:17:52,640 --> 00:17:57,525
He wrote an app called the web, and
that means he wrote protocols.

309
00:17:57,525 --> 00:18:00,950
It's like, hey, if you want to just ship
a file to somebody but have it

310
00:18:00,950 --> 00:18:05,200
render into clickable links and pictures
and stuff, here's how you

311
00:18:05,200 --> 00:18:05,770
would do that.

312
00:18:05,770 --> 00:18:08,740
And now I've programed a
server and a client.

313
00:18:08,740 --> 00:18:10,840
So, OK, world, here's your web.

314
00:18:10,840 --> 00:18:12,500
Go to town.

315
00:18:12,500 --> 00:18:16,040
>> And unbelievably, the
world did just that.

316
00:18:16,040 --> 00:18:20,140
Tim asserted no patent,
no copyright in it.

317
00:18:20,140 --> 00:18:21,310
He gave it away.

318
00:18:21,310 --> 00:18:25,460
And the web is the second great unowned,
collective hallucination that

319
00:18:25,460 --> 00:18:29,070
we have, which is also why if have a
problem with a website, you can't go

320
00:18:29,070 --> 00:18:32,880
to the CEO of the web and
have it be taken down.

321
00:18:32,880 --> 00:18:37,360
There is no such person, and there is no
main menu for the web, exactly the

322
00:18:37,360 --> 00:18:41,740
opposite of AT&T or CompuServe.

323
00:18:41,740 --> 00:18:49,840
>> It's also, then, a moment, probably
around 1995 or so, when Windows, which

324
00:18:49,840 --> 00:18:55,060
had no means of connecting to internet
protocol, got finally hooked up to it,

325
00:18:55,060 --> 00:18:57,010
thanks to this guy, named Tattam.

326
00:18:57,010 --> 00:19:01,030
At University of Tasmania, in the
psychology department, he wrote

327
00:19:01,030 --> 00:19:02,730
something called Trumpet Winsock.

328
00:19:02,730 --> 00:19:04,090
That's because he likes trumpets.

329
00:19:04,090 --> 00:19:05,090
That's him.

330
00:19:05,090 --> 00:19:11,210
And Trumpet Winsock was just a little
shim that connected your Windows 95 or

331
00:19:11,210 --> 00:19:16,330
3.1 into web and the internet.

332
00:19:16,330 --> 00:19:19,960
And suddenly everybody was like,
holy crap, this is great.

333
00:19:19,960 --> 00:19:22,370
And Tattam just said, well, if you like
it, you can send me some money,

334
00:19:22,370 --> 00:19:25,310
but otherwise it's totally up to you.

335
00:19:25,310 --> 00:19:30,290
>> And that's how you start getting
amazing content-level unowned

336
00:19:30,290 --> 00:19:33,830
technology taking off, such as
catsthatlooklikehitler.com.

337
00:19:33,830 --> 00:19:40,030
CompuServe is unlikely to put this on
its main menu, and yet it's but a

338
00:19:40,030 --> 00:19:45,540
click away on this web, with enough
people now connected that have cats

339
00:19:45,540 --> 00:19:48,860
and that know enough to upload a photo
of them, that you can get this

340
00:19:48,860 --> 00:19:54,095
incredible number four Kitler, which
is just like, I don't know how you

341
00:19:54,095 --> 00:19:57,400
would come back home
to that every day.

342
00:19:57,400 --> 00:20:00,040
>> It also lets such things
that are crazy, like

343
00:20:00,040 --> 00:20:02,320
Wikipedia, is being created.

344
00:20:02,320 --> 00:20:06,190
Can you imagine, in 2001, somebody named
Jimbo saying to you, I've got a

345
00:20:06,190 --> 00:20:06,910
great idea.

346
00:20:06,910 --> 00:20:10,580
We start with 20 articles, and then
anybody can edit anything, and before

347
00:20:10,580 --> 00:20:13,080
you know it, we'll have an
incredibly useful source.

348
00:20:13,080 --> 00:20:18,540
How many people have used Wikipedia for
medical advice in a direct way?

349
00:20:18,540 --> 00:20:19,190
Right.

350
00:20:19,190 --> 00:20:21,350
And the rest of you are
not admitting it.

351
00:20:21,350 --> 00:20:26,970
That is amazing, given how it started
and how it is sustained, by anybody

352
00:20:26,970 --> 00:20:28,870
able to edit any article at any time.

353
00:20:28,870 --> 00:20:35,220
In that sense, this is an unowned
technology at the content layer of the

354
00:20:35,220 --> 00:20:39,220
hourglass, capable of
incredible things.

355
00:20:39,220 --> 00:20:44,570
So popular, in fact, that it is now
appearing on Chinese restaurant menus.

356
00:20:44,570 --> 00:20:47,230
Not exactly sure why.

357
00:20:47,230 --> 00:20:49,790
I have a theory, but
we don't have time.

358
00:20:49,790 --> 00:20:55,670
>> So anyway, these unowned technologies
can end up yielding new unowned

359
00:20:55,670 --> 00:20:58,990
technologies and content
at other layers.

360
00:20:58,990 --> 00:21:02,320
And we end up with the amazing
explosion we've seen

361
00:21:02,320 --> 00:21:04,120
in the past 30 years.

362
00:21:04,120 --> 00:21:09,280
Incredible, powerful, still contingent,
especially because as more

363
00:21:09,280 --> 00:21:13,500
and more people use it, you start to
see that it's worth subverting.

364
00:21:13,500 --> 00:21:17,430
Whether to scam people or for your own
purposes, these technologies that

365
00:21:17,430 --> 00:21:23,000
depend on some measure of trust and
goodwill can themselves become very,

366
00:21:23,000 --> 00:21:24,410
very limited.

367
00:21:24,410 --> 00:21:28,380
And the fact that we're not accrediting
people who contribute--

368
00:21:28,380 --> 00:21:32,110
anybody can write anything, even
if you're from Tasmania--

369
00:21:32,110 --> 00:21:35,880
that cool thing can become a problem.

370
00:21:35,880 --> 00:21:42,590
>> So we see , generally, a movement from
owned stuff, with the introduction of

371
00:21:42,590 --> 00:21:46,210
the web and the internet,
to an unowned zone.

372
00:21:46,210 --> 00:21:50,845
But then, you start to see certain apps
themselves become foundational,

373
00:21:50,845 --> 00:21:55,560
and some of them may in turn be owned,
and they start to look like the new

374
00:21:55,560 --> 00:21:56,300
CompuServe.

375
00:21:56,300 --> 00:22:00,380
So there's a kind of weird cycle going,
as people shelter and look for

376
00:22:00,380 --> 00:22:04,300
stability and consistency and
security and main menus.

377
00:22:04,300 --> 00:22:08,010
And once you start getting those, and
some people and entities start to

378
00:22:08,010 --> 00:22:11,800
really get powerful in the space,
they quite naturally might

379
00:22:11,800 --> 00:22:13,190
want to assert control.

380
00:22:13,190 --> 00:22:18,260
So things they could do to be open,
they, in turn, can start to close, if

381
00:22:18,260 --> 00:22:20,640
it fits their business model to do it.

382
00:22:20,640 --> 00:22:24,570
And these are, of course, several
instances of those sorts of things

383
00:22:24,570 --> 00:22:29,830
happening, as mere apps become
foundational platforms and start

384
00:22:29,830 --> 00:22:30,750
pulling back.

385
00:22:30,750 --> 00:22:33,150
>> But this is really more of
an entrepreneurial story.

386
00:22:33,150 --> 00:22:38,140
There's a more fundamental problem going
on, which is, in all the stuff

387
00:22:38,140 --> 00:22:42,330
running on this really cool PC you might
have, whose lineage traces back

388
00:22:42,330 --> 00:22:48,360
to 1977, what happens if just one
piece of that code is bad?

389
00:22:48,360 --> 00:22:52,050
And it turns out, terrible things can
happen, because any piece of code

390
00:22:52,050 --> 00:22:56,210
written by anybody running on your
machine generally has had the keys to

391
00:22:56,210 --> 00:22:57,350
the kingdom.

392
00:22:57,350 --> 00:22:59,540
And that's kind of like The
Princess and the Pea.

393
00:22:59,540 --> 00:23:06,000
Just one problem on the computer can
spoil more than a good night's sleep.

394
00:23:06,000 --> 00:23:10,330
>> And this was something that the music
industry discovered when they produced

395
00:23:10,330 --> 00:23:13,250
the compact disc before
there were PCs.

396
00:23:13,250 --> 00:23:16,560
They produced this for an
appliance-sized world.

397
00:23:16,560 --> 00:23:21,560
The compact disc had digital quality
music on it, read by CD players.

398
00:23:21,560 --> 00:23:25,750
And the CD players were in a very
complicated arrangement with the music

399
00:23:25,750 --> 00:23:30,050
producers, so that it never even
occurred to them to put any form of

400
00:23:30,050 --> 00:23:31,750
encryption on the disc.

401
00:23:31,750 --> 00:23:33,500
Because who would decrypt it?

402
00:23:33,500 --> 00:23:35,520
How would a consumer decrypt it?

403
00:23:35,520 --> 00:23:40,430
>> Well, it turns out, once you start
putting CD-ROMs and CD readers in PCs,

404
00:23:40,430 --> 00:23:44,160
anybody can decrypt it, and
that leads to problems.

405
00:23:44,160 --> 00:23:50,420
In fact, the industry briefly tried to
use the reprogrammability of the PC as

406
00:23:50,420 --> 00:23:55,490
a feature rather than, to them, a bug,
when they started putting code onto

407
00:23:55,490 --> 00:23:59,810
these CDs, so that, if it were loaded
into a computer, the code would run

408
00:23:59,810 --> 00:24:05,380
and try to protect the computer from
copying what's on the CD, as against

409
00:24:05,380 --> 00:24:09,640
the wishes of the user, by just
watching, at all times, to see if you

410
00:24:09,640 --> 00:24:12,050
were ever going to try to rip the CD.

411
00:24:12,050 --> 00:24:15,300
>> This is called a rootkit, and
it was not very popular when

412
00:24:15,300 --> 00:24:16,350
it was found out.

413
00:24:16,350 --> 00:24:21,210
And they started outing which CDs had
this software that would ride on top,

414
00:24:21,210 --> 00:24:25,010
load itself on your computer, and refuse
to leave, even if you no longer

415
00:24:25,010 --> 00:24:27,360
liked the music.

416
00:24:27,360 --> 00:24:29,890
This is the one where it was discovered,
by the way, ironically

417
00:24:29,890 --> 00:24:32,610
called Get Right with the Man.

418
00:24:32,610 --> 00:24:37,910
Here are my top other three rootkit
CDs, The Invisible Invasion,

419
00:24:37,910 --> 00:24:42,000
Suspicious Activity, and Healthy
in Paranoid Times.

420
00:24:42,000 --> 00:24:47,010
>> Anyway, that's an example of a
compromise of your machine from a

421
00:24:47,010 --> 00:24:49,120
trusted, or not so trusted, partner.

422
00:24:49,120 --> 00:24:53,370
But this stuff starts coming out of the
wild, and you end up with things

423
00:24:53,370 --> 00:24:56,030
like the Storm Worm in 2007.

424
00:24:56,030 --> 00:24:59,460
This is one of the biggies, and
you see quotes like this.

425
00:24:59,460 --> 00:25:03,480
"It can launch attacks against those
who try to figure it out.

426
00:25:03,480 --> 00:25:05,830
It knows, and it punishes.

427
00:25:05,830 --> 00:25:07,150
Researchers are afraid.

428
00:25:07,150 --> 00:25:10,170
I've never seen this before."
And you're like, is this

429
00:25:10,170 --> 00:25:11,810
Network World, or Homeland?

430
00:25:11,810 --> 00:25:13,190
>> This is ridiculous.

431
00:25:13,190 --> 00:25:14,920
How is it so bad?

432
00:25:14,920 --> 00:25:17,990
And it has, in fact, gotten
worse and worse.

433
00:25:17,990 --> 00:25:21,270
And as we've seen more and more
sophisticated malware, we start to

434
00:25:21,270 --> 00:25:27,460
realize that just one bad move can end
up ruining things for everybody.

435
00:25:27,460 --> 00:25:33,820
And we don't really have good defenses
calculated for it yet, and that is a

436
00:25:33,820 --> 00:25:35,720
real problem.

437
00:25:35,720 --> 00:25:41,920
>> In fact, just today it was reported that
the Stuxnet virus has found its

438
00:25:41,920 --> 00:25:47,070
way onto the International Space Station
because some Russians had a

439
00:25:47,070 --> 00:25:49,040
USB key infected with it.

440
00:25:49,040 --> 00:25:52,310
And now the space station has
come down with a problem.

441
00:25:52,310 --> 00:25:54,190
That's pretty incredible.

442
00:25:54,190 --> 00:25:58,940
And it's ironic, too, because it was
a few years ago that somebody from

443
00:25:58,940 --> 00:26:03,840
Microsoft was pointing out that malware
is becoming so bad that once

444
00:26:03,840 --> 00:26:06,280
you've got it, there's basically
no way to perform an

445
00:26:06,280 --> 00:26:08,400
exorcism on your machine.

446
00:26:08,400 --> 00:26:12,990
That's this wonderful quote that says,
really what you have to do is nuke the

447
00:26:12,990 --> 00:26:19,520
systems from orbit, which starts to be
a fairly serious thing to do to clean

448
00:26:19,520 --> 00:26:21,550
your machine of a virus.

449
00:26:21,550 --> 00:26:26,110
And if you're already in orbit on the
space station, I don't know what's

450
00:26:26,110 --> 00:26:26,970
going to happen.

451
00:26:26,970 --> 00:26:30,650
>> So, anyway, this is a real problem.

452
00:26:30,650 --> 00:26:35,490
And the fundamental problem is this,
the Cap'n Crunch bosun's whistle, a

453
00:26:35,490 --> 00:26:39,140
prize in a box of Cap'n Crunch
cereal in the early 1970s.

454
00:26:39,140 --> 00:26:41,790
After you have sugared up your child,
why not have her run around the house

455
00:26:41,790 --> 00:26:42,520
and blow a whistles?

456
00:26:42,520 --> 00:26:43,940
It's the perfect prize.

457
00:26:43,940 --> 00:26:47,780
But it turns out that if you covered
one hole of the whistle after

458
00:26:47,780 --> 00:26:52,070
extracting it from the box and blew,
it emitted a tone of 2,600 hertz,

459
00:26:52,070 --> 00:26:55,590
which is exactly the tone used by AT&T,
monopoly telephone provider at

460
00:26:55,590 --> 00:26:57,660
the time, to indicate an idle line.

461
00:26:57,660 --> 00:26:59,790
Pick up the phone, blow
the whistle, get free

462
00:26:59,790 --> 00:27:02,390
long-distance telephone calling.

463
00:27:02,390 --> 00:27:06,410
Boxes of Cap'n Crunch cereal
flying off the shelves.

464
00:27:06,410 --> 00:27:08,530
General Mills has no idea why.

465
00:27:08,530 --> 00:27:13,220
And it turns out, there's a new
third-party app for their cereal.

466
00:27:13,220 --> 00:27:18,960
>> Now, this is a real problem for AT&T,
but they have an owned network, which

467
00:27:18,960 --> 00:27:20,040
means they can fix it.

468
00:27:20,040 --> 00:27:20,940
Which they did.

469
00:27:20,940 --> 00:27:25,590
They turned to out of band signaling,
so that data was distinct from code,

470
00:27:25,590 --> 00:27:28,360
and there was nothing you could
put into the data channel--

471
00:27:28,360 --> 00:27:29,520
the voice--

472
00:27:29,520 --> 00:27:32,410
that could change the way
the network worked.

473
00:27:32,410 --> 00:27:36,700
The internet is unowned and cannot
be so readily fixed.

474
00:27:36,700 --> 00:27:40,360
The very channels that carry our
music, our email, our dancing

475
00:27:40,360 --> 00:27:44,730
hamsters, are also the channels that
carry executable code for the network

476
00:27:44,730 --> 00:27:46,760
itself, and for the endpoints.

477
00:27:46,760 --> 00:27:51,070
And we wouldn't want to have it any
other way, except that now we are in a

478
00:27:51,070 --> 00:27:54,100
serious dilemma, because you click
on the wrong thing, and

479
00:27:54,100 --> 00:27:56,290
now it's all over.

480
00:27:56,290 --> 00:28:01,140
>> And we even start to see stuff being
installed before you even take it out

481
00:28:01,140 --> 00:28:01,900
of the box.

482
00:28:01,900 --> 00:28:06,660
It's compromised in one way or another,
and trying to figure out, as

483
00:28:06,660 --> 00:28:11,480
you peer into your box, whether it's
already compromised, is a hopeless,

484
00:28:11,480 --> 00:28:12,760
hopeless task.

485
00:28:12,760 --> 00:28:16,310
And try figuring out the same for
anything you hook that box up to, the

486
00:28:16,310 --> 00:28:18,510
intermediate routers, et cetera.

487
00:28:18,510 --> 00:28:25,210
Which is one reason why I think people
are very puzzled at the prospect that

488
00:28:25,210 --> 00:28:29,790
their laptop webcam could simply be
turned on by somebody who has

489
00:28:29,790 --> 00:28:32,590
compromised the machine,
and viewing everything.

490
00:28:32,590 --> 00:28:37,820
I don't know how many of you put a
Post-it note over your laptop webcam.

491
00:28:37,820 --> 00:28:39,980
I don't see any hands up.

492
00:28:39,980 --> 00:28:44,090
Turns out it's a cheap security feature,
and I recommend it, because

493
00:28:44,090 --> 00:28:49,990
you start to see that this is a
so-called RAT-- a remote access

494
00:28:49,990 --> 00:28:51,080
technology.

495
00:28:51,080 --> 00:28:53,260
>> And here is a Danish family
being viewed.

496
00:28:53,260 --> 00:28:56,180
This is from the point of view of the
hacker, who has gotten into their

497
00:28:56,180 --> 00:28:59,790
machine and is watching them as they are
computing, can completely control

498
00:28:59,790 --> 00:29:01,590
the machine, watch what's going on.

499
00:29:01,590 --> 00:29:05,190
Here is a police officer, whose
machine in his squad car was

500
00:29:05,190 --> 00:29:06,090
compromised.

501
00:29:06,090 --> 00:29:08,260
So you can watch the police
officer going around.

502
00:29:08,260 --> 00:29:11,210
I guess you can see if he's coming to
your house to arrest you for that.

503
00:29:11,210 --> 00:29:14,820
There's the chat room where they are
talking about this phenomenon, and

504
00:29:14,820 --> 00:29:17,790
amazed that they have
managed to do this.

505
00:29:17,790 --> 00:29:22,130
>> This is the kind of stuff
that makes it hard to be

506
00:29:22,130 --> 00:29:25,900
healthy in paranoid times.

507
00:29:25,900 --> 00:29:27,770
You add up this stuff--

508
00:29:27,770 --> 00:29:32,520
anywhere you see a PC, including that
CAT scan machine, you now start to

509
00:29:32,520 --> 00:29:34,970
worry about bad code getting near it.

510
00:29:34,970 --> 00:29:38,990
And this is becoming a
somewhat dire threat.

511
00:29:38,990 --> 00:29:42,950
And I think we have to recognize that
threat, because it is already changing

512
00:29:42,950 --> 00:29:48,310
the nature of the unowned technologies
that otherwise I am extolling.

513
00:29:48,310 --> 00:29:49,720
>> So what do we do about it?

514
00:29:49,720 --> 00:29:53,660
Well, here is a quick tour of
some potential solutions.

515
00:29:53,660 --> 00:29:58,720
Thinking through an axis between owned
an unowned in a given environment, and

516
00:29:58,720 --> 00:30:00,065
then hierarchy and polyarchy.

517
00:30:00,065 --> 00:30:04,730
And hierarchy means there's only
one choice for your solution.

518
00:30:04,730 --> 00:30:08,060
Everybody is bound by one entity
that does something.

519
00:30:08,060 --> 00:30:10,655
And polyarchy means no, no, there's
lots of choice and competition.

520
00:30:10,655 --> 00:30:13,540
And I'll give you some examples
to straighten this out.

521
00:30:13,540 --> 00:30:16,980
>> But let's first look at responses
to the cybersecurity

522
00:30:16,980 --> 00:30:18,770
problem, quadrant by quadrant.

523
00:30:18,770 --> 00:30:21,750
So let's look at the unowned polyarchy
one, which I think

524
00:30:21,750 --> 00:30:22,750
is basically anarchy.

525
00:30:22,750 --> 00:30:25,120
It means you're on your own.

526
00:30:25,120 --> 00:30:25,680
Good luck.

527
00:30:25,680 --> 00:30:27,290
There's lots of things you could do.

528
00:30:27,290 --> 00:30:30,930
Try to pick the right one, and
just do the best you can to

529
00:30:30,930 --> 00:30:32,910
defend what you have.

530
00:30:32,910 --> 00:30:37,300
And that, I think, is great if
you happen to be a ninja.

531
00:30:37,300 --> 00:30:39,400
It's not so great if you are not.

532
00:30:39,400 --> 00:30:42,180
And it's not even great for ninjas,
because everybody asks them for help

533
00:30:42,180 --> 00:30:43,310
and they get bored.

534
00:30:43,310 --> 00:30:47,370
>> So we start to see things like
this, designed to help you

535
00:30:47,370 --> 00:30:48,560
decide what to do.

536
00:30:48,560 --> 00:30:49,920
And if you see something like this--

537
00:30:49,920 --> 00:30:53,350
I don't know how often you
see windows like this--

538
00:30:53,350 --> 00:30:54,960
it's a Saturday night, you're
clicking around.

539
00:30:54,960 --> 00:30:58,830
How many of you, when you see a window
like this click, continue?

540
00:30:58,830 --> 00:30:59,780
Lots of hands.

541
00:30:59,780 --> 00:31:02,440
How many click cancel?

542
00:31:02,440 --> 00:31:03,680
A couple.

543
00:31:03,680 --> 00:31:04,570
Right.

544
00:31:04,570 --> 00:31:06,780
And then you click cancel, and you're
back where you started.

545
00:31:06,780 --> 00:31:08,530
You're like, but I wanted to
see the Hampster Dance.

546
00:31:08,530 --> 00:31:11,640
So then you click continue,
and away you go.

547
00:31:11,640 --> 00:31:14,800
>> This is just not an effective way of
securing things, and it reminds me of

548
00:31:14,800 --> 00:31:18,600
this email I got several years ago
warning Harvard Law School faculty and

549
00:31:18,600 --> 00:31:22,690
staff of an insurgence of fraudulent
emails at the law school, and all the

550
00:31:22,690 --> 00:31:26,480
things you have to do so that if you
click on the wrong thing you're not

551
00:31:26,480 --> 00:31:27,880
totally screwed.

552
00:31:27,880 --> 00:31:30,900
And it's just ridiculous how
much you have to do every

553
00:31:30,900 --> 00:31:31,980
time you see an email.

554
00:31:31,980 --> 00:31:34,700
This is my favorite one, by the way.
"Be weary of emails that have

555
00:31:34,700 --> 00:31:37,180
misspelling, poor grammar
or odd characters.

556
00:31:37,180 --> 00:31:44,950
They are a red flag for fraud." I wrote
back, I was like, I got one.

557
00:31:44,950 --> 00:31:49,130
And they sent me to Oxford for three
years, so never mess with your IT

558
00:31:49,130 --> 00:31:49,920
department.

559
00:31:49,920 --> 00:31:53,250
And if you're going to end up in an IT
department, don't allow yourself to be

560
00:31:53,250 --> 00:31:54,250
messed with.

561
00:31:54,250 --> 00:32:00,800
>> But anyway, you see that user ignorance
is something that is going

562
00:32:00,800 --> 00:32:04,730
to mean that it's really hard
to rely on that bottom right

563
00:32:04,730 --> 00:32:06,270
quadrant to help people.

564
00:32:06,270 --> 00:32:08,940
And I've got to say, I'm not even sure
the answer to this question.

565
00:32:08,940 --> 00:32:09,170
Right?

566
00:32:09,170 --> 00:32:10,810
If it's bad enough, I
suppose it could.

567
00:32:10,810 --> 00:32:12,530
If there's rain over Redmond.

568
00:32:12,530 --> 00:32:16,190
>> But anyway, let's look at another
quadrant, upper left.

569
00:32:16,190 --> 00:32:21,730
When I think of hierarchy and owned,
I'm thinking government.

570
00:32:21,730 --> 00:32:24,360
And what might government
do to try to help?

571
00:32:24,360 --> 00:32:27,360
Well, government has been trying
to help for about 10 years now.

572
00:32:27,360 --> 00:32:31,080
This was the original strategy
to secure cyberspace.

573
00:32:31,080 --> 00:32:31,790
It was huge.

574
00:32:31,790 --> 00:32:35,260
It basically said digital Pearl
Harbor, be very afraid.

575
00:32:35,260 --> 00:32:37,500
And we don't know what to do about it.

576
00:32:37,500 --> 00:32:40,300
So they've been trying to figure out
what to do about it, like creating

577
00:32:40,300 --> 00:32:43,790
information sharing and analysis centers
that look at the internet.

578
00:32:43,790 --> 00:32:45,360
They're like, it's down, it's down.

579
00:32:45,360 --> 00:32:47,090
It's like, OK, it's down.

580
00:32:47,090 --> 00:32:49,070
We can't tell anybody, it's down.

581
00:32:49,070 --> 00:32:54,340
>> So, one of the disadvantages of unowned
technologies are there's no

582
00:32:54,340 --> 00:32:58,210
obvious place to send the Marines, and
they have no particular comparative

583
00:32:58,210 --> 00:33:01,320
advantage, even if you could
send them, in securing

584
00:33:01,320 --> 00:33:03,000
this distributed network.

585
00:33:03,000 --> 00:33:06,680
Which means the government has had a
hard time figuring out what to do.

586
00:33:06,680 --> 00:33:10,660
Instead they made calls like this, from
former CIA director George Tenet,

587
00:33:10,660 --> 00:33:18,170
who said that, maybe we have
to make it so that people--

588
00:33:18,170 --> 00:33:20,900
the access to the web might need to be
limited to those who show they can

589
00:33:20,900 --> 00:33:22,980
take security seriously.

590
00:33:22,980 --> 00:33:24,600
It would no longer be
a world wide web.

591
00:33:24,600 --> 00:33:28,460
It would be like, three people being
like, we are very secure.

592
00:33:28,460 --> 00:33:32,620
And that's one of the problems in
trying to figure out what to do.

593
00:33:32,620 --> 00:33:35,870
>> And just a couple years ago, there was
this big thing about, oh my god, they

594
00:33:35,870 --> 00:33:39,100
have a cybersecurity bill, and the
president's going to have emergency

595
00:33:39,100 --> 00:33:41,350
power to shut down the internet.

596
00:33:41,350 --> 00:33:44,040
I don't think that amounted
to much of anything.

597
00:33:44,040 --> 00:33:46,970
And in fact the lawmakers themselves
were not pleased with these reports of

598
00:33:46,970 --> 00:33:47,930
the kill switch.

599
00:33:47,930 --> 00:33:52,760
Although it doesn't make me feel better
that, as you can see at the

600
00:33:52,760 --> 00:33:55,900
bottom, the senator was like, the
president already has the authority to

601
00:33:55,900 --> 00:33:58,570
shut down the internet under a
little-known provision of the

602
00:33:58,570 --> 00:34:03,100
Communications Act passed one month
after the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor,

603
00:34:03,100 --> 00:34:06,720
which is a very forward-looking law,
to give the president the power to

604
00:34:06,720 --> 00:34:10,780
shut down the internet after the
Japanese attacked in 1941.

605
00:34:10,780 --> 00:34:15,560
>> Anyway, we start to see other ways that
government is trying to think of

606
00:34:15,560 --> 00:34:18,560
this like the government would
think of any other form of

607
00:34:18,560 --> 00:34:20,139
intrusion into a space.

608
00:34:20,139 --> 00:34:23,020
And that's one of the negatives of
calling it cyberspace, because it's

609
00:34:23,020 --> 00:34:23,865
not really a space.

610
00:34:23,865 --> 00:34:25,860
But we think of perimeter defense.

611
00:34:25,860 --> 00:34:30,360
Of just like, well let's just put
antivirus nodes all around the edges

612
00:34:30,360 --> 00:34:33,510
of the country, and they can
shoot down incoming viruses

613
00:34:33,510 --> 00:34:34,810
like missile command.

614
00:34:34,810 --> 00:34:37,550
And it doesn't quite work that way.

615
00:34:37,550 --> 00:34:41,330
And it means, instead, that we may end
up building a system to shoot down all

616
00:34:41,330 --> 00:34:45,540
sorts of other content that has nothing
to do with network security.

617
00:34:45,540 --> 00:34:46,639
It's not clear.

618
00:34:46,639 --> 00:34:49,100
We want to take a page out of the
books of countries that have

619
00:34:49,100 --> 00:34:51,040
already done that.

620
00:34:51,040 --> 00:34:54,480
>> In the meantime, we've seen proposals
from some multinational

621
00:34:54,480 --> 00:34:57,440
multigovernment institutions, like the
International Telecommunications

622
00:34:57,440 --> 00:35:00,350
Union, to completely
redo the internet.

623
00:35:00,350 --> 00:35:03,860
As you can see, they are an extremely
hierarchical organization, kind of the

624
00:35:03,860 --> 00:35:07,260
opposite of the three guys who
started the internet off.

625
00:35:07,260 --> 00:35:12,440
And they have this idea of replacing the
hourglass was what they call the

626
00:35:12,440 --> 00:35:15,180
next generation network.

627
00:35:15,180 --> 00:35:18,550
And they started a focus group on the
next generation networks, also known

628
00:35:18,550 --> 00:35:19,870
as the FGNGN.

629
00:35:19,870 --> 00:35:24,270
And it came up with a new map
for a better tomorrow.

630
00:35:24,270 --> 00:35:26,040
>> You ready for the new hourglass?

631
00:35:26,040 --> 00:35:27,200
Here it is.

632
00:35:27,200 --> 00:35:32,010
It's ITU next generation network, and
it has everything but the animated

633
00:35:32,010 --> 00:35:32,770
paper clip.

634
00:35:32,770 --> 00:35:36,880
Suddenly it's feature laden in the
network, because the idea should be,

635
00:35:36,880 --> 00:35:41,200
they figure, that you want to be able to
make it, if packet says don't copy

636
00:35:41,200 --> 00:35:44,630
me, even if two users want to exchange
it, the network should

637
00:35:44,630 --> 00:35:45,860
know not to do it.

638
00:35:45,860 --> 00:35:50,610
That could help with content control,
and that could help with security.

639
00:35:50,610 --> 00:35:53,875
It doesn't, I think, end up mattering
that much, because trying to replace

640
00:35:53,875 --> 00:35:56,570
the network we have is really
difficult to do.

641
00:35:56,570 --> 00:35:58,410
It has a lot of inertia to it.

642
00:35:58,410 --> 00:36:02,750
Just ask the internet engineers who are
trying to upgrade it themselves.

643
00:36:02,750 --> 00:36:06,800
>> So a third quadrant here
is the upper right.

644
00:36:06,800 --> 00:36:09,120
And it's still owned,
but it's polyarchy.

645
00:36:09,120 --> 00:36:11,220
There's lots of owners,
and you get your pick.

646
00:36:11,220 --> 00:36:13,170
That's basically the corporate sector.

647
00:36:13,170 --> 00:36:17,090
It's turning to the corporate world
to say, I've got a problem.

648
00:36:17,090 --> 00:36:18,180
Sell me a solution.

649
00:36:18,180 --> 00:36:19,380
I'm not looking for government.

650
00:36:19,380 --> 00:36:20,840
I can't do it myself.

651
00:36:20,840 --> 00:36:23,300
But you could maybe come
up with something.

652
00:36:23,300 --> 00:36:27,350
And sure enough, we've seen lots of
efforts by private companies to secure

653
00:36:27,350 --> 00:36:31,480
the space, which in turn sometimes
end up in trouble.

654
00:36:31,480 --> 00:36:32,730
>> Is that RSA calling?

655
00:36:32,730 --> 00:36:34,441
I hear a weird beep.

656
00:36:34,441 --> 00:36:35,760
I guess not.

657
00:36:35,760 --> 00:36:42,170
>> Anyway, it turns out, then, that the
corporate sector tries to offer some

658
00:36:42,170 --> 00:36:45,320
measure of security, but it has the
feel, metaphorically, of securing the

659
00:36:45,320 --> 00:36:49,060
road from the Baghdad airport with
your own bodyguard force.

660
00:36:49,060 --> 00:36:53,240
It has its element of inefficiency to
it, and it means that different people

661
00:36:53,240 --> 00:36:56,790
will get different levels of security,
which can end up not

662
00:36:56,790 --> 00:36:58,410
being all that fair.

663
00:36:58,410 --> 00:37:03,340
>> In a more subtle sense, we've seen the
introduction of technologies made to

664
00:37:03,340 --> 00:37:05,950
be in the mold of the Flexowriter.

665
00:37:05,950 --> 00:37:10,190
In fact, the very company that in 1977
gave us the first great unowned

666
00:37:10,190 --> 00:37:15,220
technology, the PC, gave us the first
great owned technology exactly 30

667
00:37:15,220 --> 00:37:20,470
years later, with the iPhone, where the
iPhone says, look, we are going to

668
00:37:20,470 --> 00:37:21,840
define everything on it.

669
00:37:21,840 --> 00:37:23,030
You don't want to be like a PC.

670
00:37:23,030 --> 00:37:24,740
Those crash all the time.

671
00:37:24,740 --> 00:37:31,930
Instead what you want is to be able to
have it work, have it act just like

672
00:37:31,930 --> 00:37:33,960
that Smart Word Processor.

673
00:37:33,960 --> 00:37:35,550
Now that was the original iPhone.

674
00:37:35,550 --> 00:37:39,900
There were no apps, no App Store
on the original iPhone.

675
00:37:39,900 --> 00:37:44,300
It was more just like basically saying,
look, we're going to close it

676
00:37:44,300 --> 00:37:47,190
off, and this is going to look
like something some of

677
00:37:47,190 --> 00:37:48,570
you have seen before.

678
00:37:48,570 --> 00:37:51,280
And we will define what
goes on the phone.

679
00:37:51,280 --> 00:37:56,250
>> Now, that changed when, a couple years
later, they introduced the software

680
00:37:56,250 --> 00:38:01,440
developers kit, and suddenly third
parties could code for the iPhone.

681
00:38:01,440 --> 00:38:03,210
And that includes you.

682
00:38:03,210 --> 00:38:04,820
This is not a real Newsweek cover.

683
00:38:04,820 --> 00:38:07,480
In fact, it's not clear to me
Newsweek exists anymore.

684
00:38:07,480 --> 00:38:11,410
But anyway, it's just a bad
dream, the whole thing.

685
00:38:11,410 --> 00:38:14,780
>> It turns out, though, that they
put an extra tweak in.

686
00:38:14,780 --> 00:38:16,040
it's not like VisiCalc.

687
00:38:16,040 --> 00:38:19,300
If you invent something that's going to
run on somebody's iPhone, and you

688
00:38:19,300 --> 00:38:22,520
want to give it to them, and they want
to take it, it must go through the App

689
00:38:22,520 --> 00:38:26,280
Store, which in turn says, we're not
going to allow illegal, malicious,

690
00:38:26,280 --> 00:38:31,000
privacy invading, porn, bandwidth
hog, or my favorite, unforeseen.

691
00:38:31,000 --> 00:38:35,820
We can't have anything unforeseen
happening on the iPhone.

692
00:38:35,820 --> 00:38:41,590
And that App Store model is responding
to a very real and pressing problem in

693
00:38:41,590 --> 00:38:43,160
the unowned universe.

694
00:38:43,160 --> 00:38:46,610
But it's a solution that comes
with its own worries.

695
00:38:46,610 --> 00:38:51,830
>> So, for example, when a guy created
something called Freedom Time,

696
00:38:51,830 --> 00:38:55,880
counting down the end of George W.
Bush's term, it was rejected

697
00:38:55,880 --> 00:38:57,760
from the App Store.

698
00:38:57,760 --> 00:39:02,200
And he actually wrote a note to Steve
Jobs asking why it had been rejected.

699
00:39:02,200 --> 00:39:05,870
Steve Jobs wrote back and said, this
is going to be offensive to roughly

700
00:39:05,870 --> 00:39:06,830
half our customers.

701
00:39:06,830 --> 00:39:08,340
What's the point?

702
00:39:08,340 --> 00:39:13,050
And you realize that people are now
walking around with their technology.

703
00:39:13,050 --> 00:39:13,830
They may want it.

704
00:39:13,830 --> 00:39:15,070
You may want to give it to them.

705
00:39:15,070 --> 00:39:19,300
But somebody in the middle has
to be persuaded of its worth

706
00:39:19,300 --> 00:39:20,460
before allowing it.

707
00:39:20,460 --> 00:39:23,410
>> That's a very different technological
environment.

708
00:39:23,410 --> 00:39:26,550
And it's one that Steve Jobs
accurately foresaw.

709
00:39:26,550 --> 00:39:28,570
It's not just about mobile phones.

710
00:39:28,570 --> 00:39:31,290
This is coming to all
our technologies.

711
00:39:31,290 --> 00:39:36,290
And indeed, we've started to see hybrids
and other ways in which our

712
00:39:36,290 --> 00:39:40,250
own PC architecture is
now App Store driven.

713
00:39:40,250 --> 00:39:42,260
>> This is now like, we take
it for granted.

714
00:39:42,260 --> 00:39:45,310
Two years ago, it would have been, I'm
not so sure that's going to happen.

715
00:39:45,310 --> 00:39:49,540
And years before that, it would have
been insane to suggest such a thing.

716
00:39:49,540 --> 00:39:51,690
And, of course, the other day
I tried to load this--

717
00:39:51,690 --> 00:39:53,890
I don't even know what it does,
this thing called Vuze.

718
00:39:53,890 --> 00:39:55,220
Anybody familiar with it?

719
00:39:55,220 --> 00:40:00,390
Anyway, I tried to load it on my
Mac, and I said, no, no, sorry.

720
00:40:00,390 --> 00:40:03,900
You can only allow things approved
by the App Store.

721
00:40:03,900 --> 00:40:08,140
If you're totally nuts, you can change
your settings to allow any old stuff

722
00:40:08,140 --> 00:40:09,490
to run on your machine.

723
00:40:09,490 --> 00:40:12,300
But why would you possibly
want to do that?

724
00:40:12,300 --> 00:40:16,580
>> And it turns out that it's not
just Apple doing that now.

725
00:40:16,580 --> 00:40:21,430
Every major producer is building
architectures that are both meant to

726
00:40:21,430 --> 00:40:26,520
secure things and that become
vectors for control.

727
00:40:26,520 --> 00:40:31,590
And if you think Android is open, just
wait until it gets a particularly bad

728
00:40:31,590 --> 00:40:33,740
set of malware, and you'll see--

729
00:40:33,740 --> 00:40:35,500
this is the SMS Zombie--

730
00:40:35,500 --> 00:40:38,670
I don't know who would click on
"Animated Album I Found When I Fixed

731
00:40:38,670 --> 00:40:42,960
My Female Coworker's Computer," but
enough people did, and ended up then

732
00:40:42,960 --> 00:40:44,920
with Android malware.

733
00:40:44,920 --> 00:40:48,710
And you start to see the rate of
uptake of malware happening.

734
00:40:48,710 --> 00:40:52,990
And you realize that it's just a matter
of time before we go to an App

735
00:40:52,990 --> 00:40:55,290
Store model for everything.

736
00:40:55,290 --> 00:40:59,990
>> So that which has become unowned is
becoming owned, and that which is

737
00:40:59,990 --> 00:41:05,080
owned but open is becoming just owned,
for all sorts of reasons.

738
00:41:05,080 --> 00:41:09,200
And we're seeing it not just on endpoint
devices, but in the cloud as

739
00:41:09,200 --> 00:41:14,020
well, as more and more platforms are
starting to be intermediaries between

740
00:41:14,020 --> 00:41:17,450
you and ostensibly an independent
party that you want

741
00:41:17,450 --> 00:41:18,770
to communicate with.

742
00:41:18,770 --> 00:41:22,630
Just ask the people who did something
called Critter Island, a

743
00:41:22,630 --> 00:41:24,290
somewhat busy game.

744
00:41:24,290 --> 00:41:29,180
And it had 150 million users back in
its heyday, until it did something

745
00:41:29,180 --> 00:41:30,610
that Facebook didn't like.

746
00:41:30,610 --> 00:41:35,460
Facebook simply pulled the plug, and
there is its user graph right at the

747
00:41:35,460 --> 00:41:37,880
moment that Facebook pulled the plug.

748
00:41:37,880 --> 00:41:43,230
That's very different from the zone
where you get Napster out there, and

749
00:41:43,230 --> 00:41:44,110
Napster is out there.

750
00:41:44,110 --> 00:41:46,750
There's no way that Bill Gates or
anybody else could have pulled the

751
00:41:46,750 --> 00:41:49,440
plug on it, for better or for worse.

752
00:41:49,440 --> 00:41:53,840
>> And control over the code means
control over the content.

753
00:41:53,840 --> 00:41:56,840
So, for example, when the
Kindle came out--

754
00:41:56,840 --> 00:42:00,770
perfect example of an owned Friden
Flexowriter style device--

755
00:42:00,770 --> 00:42:08,650
there was a third party that submitted
through Amazon, 1984 for $0.99.

756
00:42:08,650 --> 00:42:09,840
And people bought it.

757
00:42:09,840 --> 00:42:11,930
And then the person submitting
it was like, oops, it's under

758
00:42:11,930 --> 00:42:12,950
copyright in the US.

759
00:42:12,950 --> 00:42:14,730
I thought it was in the public domain.

760
00:42:14,730 --> 00:42:16,010
My mistake.

761
00:42:16,010 --> 00:42:19,800
Amazon was like, oh my god, we
could be in big trouble for

762
00:42:19,800 --> 00:42:20,960
allowing this to happen.

763
00:42:20,960 --> 00:42:24,490
And as a result, Amazon reached into
every single Kindle that had

764
00:42:24,490 --> 00:42:31,230
downloaded 1984 and deleted 1984
from the Kindle from afar.

765
00:42:31,230 --> 00:42:33,590
>> It's like, you don't have 1984.

766
00:42:33,590 --> 00:42:36,050
You never had 1984.

767
00:42:36,050 --> 00:42:40,440
There's no such book as 1984.

768
00:42:40,440 --> 00:42:42,250
Now, that's a problem.

769
00:42:42,250 --> 00:42:45,180
And it's not as much of a problem when
this happened, because there were

770
00:42:45,180 --> 00:42:45,970
still bookstores.

771
00:42:45,970 --> 00:42:47,560
Remember bookstores?

772
00:42:47,560 --> 00:42:48,670
Remember libraries?

773
00:42:48,670 --> 00:42:52,190
It was like, don't worry, there's a
place that just has this already

774
00:42:52,190 --> 00:42:55,940
printed out and bound on paper in the
unlikely event that somebody should

775
00:42:55,940 --> 00:43:01,300
walk in and be like, I'd like to give
you $5 for a printed copy of 1984.

776
00:43:01,300 --> 00:43:04,700
How totally absurd is that
as a business model?

777
00:43:04,700 --> 00:43:08,860
And as that fades, and you start to go
to print on demand or read on demand,

778
00:43:08,860 --> 00:43:12,400
you realize that control over
content is a serious thing.

779
00:43:12,400 --> 00:43:15,560
>> And I just want to be sure, it's not
just Amazon here that's a baddy.

780
00:43:15,560 --> 00:43:17,980
It's Barnes and Noble as well.

781
00:43:17,980 --> 00:43:18,830
I was reading--

782
00:43:18,830 --> 00:43:20,640
talk about not having much of a life--

783
00:43:20,640 --> 00:43:24,800
I was reading War and Peace the other
day when I read this passage.

784
00:43:24,800 --> 00:43:28,310
"A vivid glow Nookd in her face."
What the hell is that?

785
00:43:28,310 --> 00:43:32,200
"The flame of the sulphur splinters
Nookd--" Why is the work "Nookd" all

786
00:43:32,200 --> 00:43:33,770
over War and Peace?

787
00:43:33,770 --> 00:43:37,820
And then you realize that every place
the word "Kindle" would appear, it has

788
00:43:37,820 --> 00:43:47,730
been replaced by the
word "Nook." Yeah.

789
00:43:47,730 --> 00:43:49,670
>> Now that wasn't Barnes and Noble.

790
00:43:49,670 --> 00:43:53,460
That was a third party who had probably
done this Amazon ebook and

791
00:43:53,460 --> 00:43:56,750
then just re-purposed it to go on the
Nook, and figured they would change

792
00:43:56,750 --> 00:44:00,690
their wrapper content on either end to
say, oh, find us on our Nook store,

793
00:44:00,690 --> 00:44:02,990
and did a search and replace,
and disaster happened.

794
00:44:02,990 --> 00:44:08,910
But you start to realize just how
readily this could be repurposed.

795
00:44:08,910 --> 00:44:11,390
And believe me, if you're halfway
through War and Peace, you're just

796
00:44:11,390 --> 00:44:14,290
like, whatevs, that's Tolstoy for you.

797
00:44:14,290 --> 00:44:15,500
What are you going to do?

798
00:44:15,500 --> 00:44:20,590
>> So this is an era in which our products
are becoming services, and

799
00:44:20,590 --> 00:44:22,620
you think, I've I got a toaster.

800
00:44:22,620 --> 00:44:23,600
Well, that's a product.

801
00:44:23,600 --> 00:44:26,950
Imagine your toaster as
a web-enabled service.

802
00:44:26,950 --> 00:44:27,780
What does that mean?

803
00:44:27,780 --> 00:44:30,220
It means you come down one day, it's
like, congratulations, you've gotten

804
00:44:30,220 --> 00:44:31,400
the Tuesday update.

805
00:44:31,400 --> 00:44:33,110
You now have three slots.

806
00:44:33,110 --> 00:44:35,010
You're like, well that's pretty cool.

807
00:44:35,010 --> 00:44:37,090
And then the next day, they're like
, sorry we rolled it back.

808
00:44:37,090 --> 00:44:37,860
There was a problem.

809
00:44:37,860 --> 00:44:40,530
We apologize for any toast
that was crushed.

810
00:44:40,530 --> 00:44:43,915
And then on Friday, you go down
and it's making orange juice.

811
00:44:43,915 --> 00:44:45,650
You're like what do I own?

812
00:44:45,650 --> 00:44:47,430
The answer is you own nothing.

813
00:44:47,430 --> 00:44:50,280
You have a long term service
oriented relationship

814
00:44:50,280 --> 00:44:52,720
with a breakfast provider.

815
00:44:52,720 --> 00:44:57,810
And that is great, but it's also
something that we are still trying to

816
00:44:57,810 --> 00:45:02,250
wrap our arms around as we get
used to this kind of thing.

817
00:45:02,250 --> 00:45:06,380
And the regulatory possibilities
are only just beginning.

818
00:45:06,380 --> 00:45:10,530
>> So, for example, some of you may
remember the old OnStar system.

819
00:45:10,530 --> 00:45:11,390
It was in your car.

820
00:45:11,390 --> 00:45:14,220
You'd be driving around, and you get
lost or something, and you press the

821
00:45:14,220 --> 00:45:16,320
button in the rearview mirror.

822
00:45:16,320 --> 00:45:19,120
It has a little microphone so you can
speak right into it, and speakers so

823
00:45:19,120 --> 00:45:21,120
you can hear what people say back.

824
00:45:21,120 --> 00:45:23,420
And this woman answers when
you press the help button.

825
00:45:23,420 --> 00:45:25,090
And you're like, I can't get up.

826
00:45:25,090 --> 00:45:25,650
Please help.

827
00:45:25,650 --> 00:45:28,450
And she's like, well,
help is on the way.

828
00:45:28,450 --> 00:45:33,380
>> And then it turns out that the FBI
ends up going to an OnStar like

829
00:45:33,380 --> 00:45:38,120
company and says, I want you, for this
car, to simply turn on the microphone,

830
00:45:38,120 --> 00:45:41,300
and listen to everything going
on in the car at all times.

831
00:45:41,300 --> 00:45:42,980
And the company was like, uhh.

832
00:45:42,980 --> 00:45:44,790
And they're like, that's what
you're going to do.

833
00:45:44,790 --> 00:45:46,120
We're the FBI.

834
00:45:46,120 --> 00:45:49,510
The company said OK, and then sued
anonymously, leading to this wonderful

835
00:45:49,510 --> 00:45:55,280
case, The Company v. United States of
America, in which, it turned out,

836
00:45:55,280 --> 00:45:59,670
then, that this was not permitted under
the Wiretap Act for the thinnest

837
00:45:59,670 --> 00:46:00,310
of reasons.

838
00:46:00,310 --> 00:46:04,560
Which namely was the way the FBI asked
for it to happen, to be implemented.

839
00:46:04,560 --> 00:46:07,690
If the person asked for help because
they were really in trouble, it would

840
00:46:07,690 --> 00:46:11,510
still only go to the FBI, rather than
OnStar, or that company, which

841
00:46:11,510 --> 00:46:13,410
presumably would not come and help.

842
00:46:13,410 --> 00:46:18,560
But if you could fix that glitch, you
would be in a position to change the

843
00:46:18,560 --> 00:46:19,750
way this works.

844
00:46:19,750 --> 00:46:26,580
>> So, all sorts of ways in which malleable
software, for which changing

845
00:46:26,580 --> 00:46:32,130
it is the prerogative and privilege of
the vendor, overriding, or getting to

846
00:46:32,130 --> 00:46:36,150
permit, third party change,
that's today.

847
00:46:36,150 --> 00:46:40,870
That's the new environment, and it is
the environment of the System/360.

848
00:46:40,870 --> 00:46:46,310
You don't own your stuff anymore,
and that is a real problem.

849
00:46:46,310 --> 00:46:48,090
>> So what do we do about it?

850
00:46:48,090 --> 00:46:52,270
Well, I'm going to give you some ideas
in the next 4 and 1/2 minutes.

851
00:46:52,270 --> 00:46:57,940
So, one possibility is to return to
these very unowned technologies and

852
00:46:57,940 --> 00:47:01,600
look for new means of defense
in this quadrant.

853
00:47:01,600 --> 00:47:06,220
Coming in an unowned fashion, but so
powerful, so persuasive, so widely

854
00:47:06,220 --> 00:47:10,400
adopted, that they end up being things
that the criminals can't easily opt

855
00:47:10,400 --> 00:47:14,090
out of, which is what puts them on
the left side of this graph.

856
00:47:14,090 --> 00:47:17,560
It's something that Wikipedia has
discovered, in that any administrator

857
00:47:17,560 --> 00:47:22,610
of Wikipedia can be making changes to
Wikipedia in a privileged way, but

858
00:47:22,610 --> 00:47:26,770
still in this kind of distributed,
unowned fashion, in order to try to

859
00:47:26,770 --> 00:47:29,190
make for a better encyclopedia.

860
00:47:29,190 --> 00:47:33,250
And they just take through a list of
people that complain about stuff all

861
00:47:33,250 --> 00:47:38,160
day long, and for no money,
they just keep fixing it.

862
00:47:38,160 --> 00:47:42,320
That is an incredible story, and
always a contingent one, that I

863
00:47:42,320 --> 00:47:47,920
believe has lessons for how people can
intervene usefully in ways to secure

864
00:47:47,920 --> 00:47:48,910
the internet.

865
00:47:48,910 --> 00:47:52,550
>> And I'll just give you some examples
of unowned but powerful--

866
00:47:52,550 --> 00:47:57,050
so powerful they move to the left on
that chart-- technologies like Tor,

867
00:47:57,050 --> 00:48:01,170
where, with enough computers together,
you can end up laundering the source

868
00:48:01,170 --> 00:48:04,170
and destination of packets, so the
something like the Silk Road could be

869
00:48:04,170 --> 00:48:08,620
up and unfindable, even though it's a
click away, for months at a time.

870
00:48:08,620 --> 00:48:12,080
It took the owner of the Silk Road
trying to put out a hit on one of his

871
00:48:12,080 --> 00:48:15,270
vendors for the cops to be
able to find this person.

872
00:48:15,270 --> 00:48:17,080
That's pretty incredible.

873
00:48:17,080 --> 00:48:20,410
For better or worse, this is an example
of a technology, then, that

874
00:48:20,410 --> 00:48:23,660
defies a certain kind of OnStar
like surveillance.

875
00:48:23,660 --> 00:48:27,200
At the content layer, we see things like
Ushahidi, which allow people to

876
00:48:27,200 --> 00:48:30,550
immediately throw up a map and make
reports of things, so after an

877
00:48:30,550 --> 00:48:34,370
earthquake or with other problems, you
have people coming together in a

878
00:48:34,370 --> 00:48:38,090
civic, unowned kind of way, to
actually create a collective

879
00:48:38,090 --> 00:48:41,220
hallucination, that in this case
is a map of trouble, that can

880
00:48:41,220 --> 00:48:44,320
become quite reliable.

881
00:48:44,320 --> 00:48:47,520
>> This is an idea that we're pursuing over
at the Berkman Center, in which

882
00:48:47,520 --> 00:48:51,370
currently, if you try to access a web
page, it renders some links, and you

883
00:48:51,370 --> 00:48:54,310
click on one of those links and try
to go where the link points.

884
00:48:54,310 --> 00:48:56,200
If you can't get there, that's it.

885
00:48:56,200 --> 00:48:57,250
You're stuck.

886
00:48:57,250 --> 00:49:02,540
Well, what if we made it so that when
you visit a page, it has already

887
00:49:02,540 --> 00:49:05,300
cached some of the links
that point elsewhere?

888
00:49:05,300 --> 00:49:09,370
It's taken a copy from that server to
itself, so that if you go to the

889
00:49:09,370 --> 00:49:13,500
server and you can't get there, you can
go back to the place where you got

890
00:49:13,500 --> 00:49:15,890
the link, and it will send
you what you missed.

891
00:49:15,890 --> 00:49:20,080
>> That's an example of a distributed
defensive system that could take some

892
00:49:20,080 --> 00:49:23,250
of the sting out of distributed
denial of service attacks.

893
00:49:23,250 --> 00:49:26,050
And, it turns out, if the filtering,
if the blocking is somewhere in the

894
00:49:26,050 --> 00:49:29,460
middle, maybe thanks to government
filtering, this system would be a

895
00:49:29,460 --> 00:49:31,220
distributed means around it.

896
00:49:31,220 --> 00:49:35,010
That's an example of an unowned
civic technology coming back.

897
00:49:35,010 --> 00:49:38,800
>> Now if the entire plug is pulled on the
internet, as now has been known to

898
00:49:38,800 --> 00:49:41,330
happen, although at the time
it was like, wow, who knew

899
00:49:41,330 --> 00:49:43,040
that actually happened?

900
00:49:43,040 --> 00:49:46,840
It turns out there's mesh networking, in
which each one of our devices could

901
00:49:46,840 --> 00:49:51,280
be programmed to be able to respond
to nearby devices, and then onward

902
00:49:51,280 --> 00:49:56,030
onward, like that beer passing brigade
at Fenway Park, so that we end up with

903
00:49:56,030 --> 00:49:59,540
a network among ourselves, possibly
with cached Facebook and Twitter

904
00:49:59,540 --> 00:50:00,370
credentials.

905
00:50:00,370 --> 00:50:04,330
So you can find your Facebook friends
in your mesh network without even

906
00:50:04,330 --> 00:50:05,910
having to get to facebook.com.

907
00:50:05,910 --> 00:50:11,150
That's an example of a distributed,
unowned collective hallucination that

908
00:50:11,150 --> 00:50:13,930
could greatly affect security.

909
00:50:13,930 --> 00:50:19,890
>> There was a time when there was a debate
among state governments about

910
00:50:19,890 --> 00:50:24,790
slavery, and about returning slaves
to the South who were on

911
00:50:24,790 --> 00:50:26,050
the run in the North.

912
00:50:26,050 --> 00:50:30,470
And a political accommodation was
reached, to try to prevent the Civil

913
00:50:30,470 --> 00:50:34,250
War at the time, that they
would be returned.

914
00:50:34,250 --> 00:50:36,160
And it turns out it didn't work.

915
00:50:36,160 --> 00:50:37,670
And why didn't it work?

916
00:50:37,670 --> 00:50:42,360
Because there was not centralized
law enforcement in any big way.

917
00:50:42,360 --> 00:50:46,460
If you needed to find somebody or do
anything that was bigger than a single

918
00:50:46,460 --> 00:50:50,920
arrest, you needed a posse, you needed
to recruit citizens to do it.

919
00:50:50,920 --> 00:50:55,900
And enough citizens were like, I don't
think so, that it didn't happen.

920
00:50:55,900 --> 00:51:01,190
Technologies that rely on the general
public to work are also technologies

921
00:51:01,190 --> 00:51:05,110
that have some check valves against
abuse in a way that's different from

922
00:51:05,110 --> 00:51:10,590
the check valves against abuse that
we are familiar with from the more

923
00:51:10,590 --> 00:51:13,930
traditional centralized
government scenarios.

924
00:51:13,930 --> 00:51:16,490
>> So I end up with this question.

925
00:51:16,490 --> 00:51:19,810
You are now graduating from CS50.

926
00:51:19,810 --> 00:51:26,100
You've gotten the bug bit that gets
you into this technology.

927
00:51:26,100 --> 00:51:29,370
And in this following puzzle from
Game of Thrones, try to think

928
00:51:29,370 --> 00:51:30,620
about who you are.

929
00:51:30,620 --> 00:51:33,746

930
00:51:33,746 --> 00:51:34,705
>> [VIDEO PLAYBACK]

931
00:51:34,705 --> 00:51:35,810
>> -Are you fond of riddles?

932
00:51:35,810 --> 00:51:35,866
>> -Why?

933
00:51:35,866 --> 00:51:37,300
Am I about to hear one?

934
00:51:37,300 --> 00:51:42,630
>> -Three great men sit it a room, a king,
a priest, and the rich man.

935
00:51:42,630 --> 00:51:45,630
Between them stands a
common cell sword.

936
00:51:45,630 --> 00:51:49,610
Each great man bids the cell
sword kill the other two.

937
00:51:49,610 --> 00:51:50,490
Who lives?

938
00:51:50,490 --> 00:51:52,840
Who dies?

939
00:51:52,840 --> 00:51:54,300
>> -Depends on the cell sword.

940
00:51:54,300 --> 00:51:55,280
>> -Does it?

941
00:51:55,280 --> 00:51:58,710
He has neither crown, nor gold,
nor favor with the gods.

942
00:51:58,710 --> 00:51:59,450
>> -He has a sword.

943
00:51:59,450 --> 00:52:00,770
The power of life and death.

944
00:52:00,770 --> 00:52:05,305
>> -But if it's swordsmen who rule, why
do we pretend kings hold all the

945
00:52:05,305 --> 00:52:05,440
power?

946
00:52:05,440 --> 00:52:07,240
>> -I've decided I don't like riddles.

947
00:52:07,240 --> 00:52:08,440
>> [END VIDEO PLAYBACK]

948
00:52:08,440 --> 00:52:14,290
>> JONATHAN ZITTRAIN: OK, so, in this
scenario, I think you're either

949
00:52:14,290 --> 00:52:18,760
Maesters in training, for those
who read the books, or

950
00:52:18,760 --> 00:52:20,070
you've got the sword.

951
00:52:20,070 --> 00:52:21,140
That's what you're sharpening.

952
00:52:21,140 --> 00:52:26,340
You have a tool that you can use in
an environment still sufficiently

953
00:52:26,340 --> 00:52:30,690
generative that in a week you
could flip things over.

954
00:52:30,690 --> 00:52:33,380
You could completely transform
it with some good code

955
00:52:33,380 --> 00:52:35,050
deployed on this network.

956
00:52:35,050 --> 00:52:40,140
How you choose to use it will, in part,
influence whether anybody sees

957
00:52:40,140 --> 00:52:45,630
reason to keep the network generative,
or whether it's time to just call it

958
00:52:45,630 --> 00:52:49,070
quits and go back to the
Flexowriters we love.

959
00:52:49,070 --> 00:52:51,250
>> In this graph of people--

960
00:52:51,250 --> 00:52:53,830
this is Clarke's Third Law
coming back again--

961
00:52:53,830 --> 00:52:57,080
basically there are Luddites on the
left, so removed from technology that

962
00:52:57,080 --> 00:52:58,600
they don't care what happens
in the world.

963
00:52:58,600 --> 00:53:01,030
OnStar isn't a problem, because
they don't drive.

964
00:53:01,030 --> 00:53:03,500
OK, not that many left of those.

965
00:53:03,500 --> 00:53:05,560
They are all the Harvard bookstore.

966
00:53:05,560 --> 00:53:09,620
Then, on the right, you have the nerds,
who are the ninjas, who can get

967
00:53:09,620 --> 00:53:10,420
around anything.

968
00:53:10,420 --> 00:53:14,880
In the middle, you have the public.

969
00:53:14,880 --> 00:53:21,160
And you have a chance to emerge from the
herd, while still remembering what

970
00:53:21,160 --> 00:53:26,870
it was like, and influence the course
of history in a way that

971
00:53:26,870 --> 00:53:29,030
is better for everybody.

972
00:53:29,030 --> 00:53:30,860
>> So, to me, that is the test.

973
00:53:30,860 --> 00:53:35,580
Can we make systems that distribute
power, rather than focus it,

974
00:53:35,580 --> 00:53:38,580
and still be secure?

975
00:53:38,580 --> 00:53:42,620
And I am confident that the answer lies
within this room, and over this

976
00:53:42,620 --> 00:53:48,220
webcast, and with those who are
curious enough to undergo the

977
00:53:48,220 --> 00:53:50,580
phenomenon that is CS50.

978
00:53:50,580 --> 00:53:56,440
And they are the kind of people that,
clacking late at night, end up like

979
00:53:56,440 --> 00:53:56,800
this.

980
00:53:56,800 --> 00:53:57,890
>> "Are you coming to bed?

981
00:53:57,890 --> 00:53:58,520
>> I can't.

982
00:53:58,520 --> 00:53:59,570
This is important.

983
00:53:59,570 --> 00:54:00,290
>> What?

984
00:54:00,290 --> 00:54:03,130
>> Someone is wrong on the internet."

985
00:54:03,130 --> 00:54:07,030
>> That's the instinct I believe
that's going to save us.

986
00:54:07,030 --> 00:54:08,280
Thank you very much.

987
00:54:08,280 --> 00:54:16,980

988
00:54:16,980 --> 00:54:18,870
>> DAVID MALAN: Thank you so much
to professor Zittrain.

989
00:54:18,870 --> 00:54:20,185
Do come on up if you have questions.

990
00:54:20,185 --> 00:54:21,860
We'll see you on Wednesday.

991
00:54:21,860 --> 00:54:24,896