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[MUSIC PLAYING]

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DAVID MALAN: This is CS50 Live.

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Now, you may recall just
a few weeks ago GitLab,

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a popular website for
hosting people's sourcecode

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suffered a bit of a error, whereby
they deleted a whole lot of data

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from their customers.

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And it turns out just a few weeks later,
did another company, DigitalOcean--

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this one a cloud hosting provider,
whereby you can host your websites

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on them in the cloud--

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also made a bit of a mistake.

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Indeed, they reported this.

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"On April 5th 2017 we
began to receive alerts

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that our public services
were not functioning."

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They went on to say, "within three
minutes of the initial alerts

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we discovered that our primary
database had been deleted."

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The root cause of this
incident, they later said,

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was, "an engineering driven
configuration error."

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they went on, "a process performing
automated testing was misconfigured

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using production credentials."

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Now, for more on this, and
to explain this failure let's

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go to a CS50's own, Doug Lloyd.

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DOUG LLOYD: An engineering
driven configuration.

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No.

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Somebody screwed up.

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Somebody typed the wrong thing.

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And they screwed up.

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Back to you, David.

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DAVID MALAN: If you'd like to dive
in deeper to this particular error,

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head to this URL here.

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Now, speaking of failures, also in
the news of late was CloudFlare.

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This time a cloud based company that
provides content delivery network

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services, or CDN services.

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It turns out that this company, which
many other websites use in order

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to serve up their data, static data,
in particular, HTML, and the like,

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had a bit of a bug, whereby they were
accidentally leaking some customer's

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data in other customers websites.

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In particular, in some cases, which,
to be fair, were rare but common enough

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that researchers at Google
and beyond saw this,

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if certain web pages had HTML
like this where the tag was not

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fully closed as there at
right what would happen

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is this, so-called buffer overflow,
whereby data actually leaked out

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of their servers to the wrong customers.

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So for instance, if a customer was very
deliberately pulling this music website

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here they might actually see, maybe
later in the website, or somewhere else

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in its source code, text, or
specifically HTTP headers,

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and other data, belonging
to other customers.

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Now, who might those customers be?

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Well, if I'm visiting
this music based website,

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I might actually be seeing
data from other customers who

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have accounts on Uber, or
OkCupid, or FitBit, or others,

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which is to say, even, if
I don't have an OkCupid

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account, or Fitbit,
or an Uber account, I

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might be seeing someone
else's data who actually does.

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So suffice it to say, this is bad.

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But its origins could be traced
to a very specific line of code.

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In fact, in C, on the servers
that CloudFlare were running,

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were these lines here.

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And notice the check of two
pointers, P and PE for equality.

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The result of which was this,
because of that overflow error

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it's possible that PE could
sometimes be smaller than P. And so,

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simply by checking
only for equals equals

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was the problem, ultimately resulting.

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And so had the check been done
using greater than or equal to,

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instead of just equal equal
to, jumping over the buffer end

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would have been caught.

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A simple fix, and a relatively simple
problem, with massive implications

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for customer's privacy.

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Now, in other, even
scarier, news is in Brazil,

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whereby bank robbers
actually hijacked and robbed

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a bank that was using
its website in order

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to provide users with transactions,
and support for adding online banking.

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Unfortunately, they were
not particularly secure.

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And these bank robbers were
able to digitally take over

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their entire network.

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For more on this particular
attack let's turn

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to see us CS50's own resident security
expert, and only Jeopardy champion,

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CS50's own Doug Lloyd.

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DOUG LLOYD: Thanks David.

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As you point out, this is, in fact,
a modern form of bank robbery.

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What happened in this case is that
customers went to visit their bank

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website, or what they thought
was their bank website,

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but actually were visiting perfectly
duplicated clones created by hackers.

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And what these hackers were able to do
is to hack into the domain name system

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to change where the customers
thought they were going.

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In fact, this attack was even
so secure that the hackers were

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able to secure SSL certificates,
which create those green locks that we

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see in our URL bars, and our browsers
to indicate that a site is secure.

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So the customers were
visiting this bank website,

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thought that they were
accessing something secure,

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and they would type in
their banking credentials,

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and complete the hacker's attack.

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Now, to date, the bank
in question has not even

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been identified because
those hackers were

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able to change the domain
name system records,

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and the bank couldn't then even
email their customers as a result.

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DAVID MALAN: Now, Doug, you keep
mentioning domain name system records.

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What are these, exactly?

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DOUG LLOYD: So David, recall that the
domain name system maps, commonly used

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URLs that we would type into our
browser bars to IP addresses.

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And what the hackers
were able to do here

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was to convince the
registrar of domain names

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in Brazil to map the
bank's legitimate domain

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names to the hacker's IP addresses.

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DAVID MALAN: Now, this all,
Doug, sounds very sophisticated.

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What can little customers like me
do to protect our hard earned money

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in banks like this?

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DOUG LLOYD: That's a great question.

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And I would recommend that
everybody do what I do,

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which is to put all of my
money under my mattress.

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DAVID MALAN: Thanks, Doug.

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Well, now, here closer to home
has been reports of fishing.

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Indeed, all over campus
here at Harvard are

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posters like this encouraging
people to report phishing,

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the process whereby adversaries send
you an email that might look legitimate,

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but is really some form of spam,
but that generally contains links,

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or URLs to other websites that
also look legitimate, but are,

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in fact, copies of other websites,
not unlike banks, whereby you can then

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trick users into providing
you with their usernames,

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their passwords, thereby, ultimately
taking over their account.

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In fact, according to this
very click-baity headline,

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Everyone Is Falling For This
Frighteningly Effective Gmail Scam.

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Now, what is this?

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And how is it plaguing
campuses like ours?

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Well, if you're a Gmail
user you might recall

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receiving e-mails that look like this.

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And sometimes, of course, your
e-mails contain attachments.

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Now, Gmail draws your
attention to the attachments

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by providing with a very
convenient downward facing icon

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that when clicked allows
you to download that PDF.

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But what if an adversary,
someone trying to deceive you,

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has sent you, not an attachment, but
simply an otherwise blank email that

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contains an image embedded in it
that looks, per this rectangle,

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exactly like the rectangle that
g-mail generates automatically

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for actual attachments.

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Moreover, what if this
embedded image is really

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a hyperlink to some other web page
that then asks me for credentials,

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like my Gmail username and password?

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Now, normally this wouldn't be such a
concern, because if a link like this

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led to a web page on
some foreign server where

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I'm being tricked into
typing in my credentials,

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well, Harvard, or my
internet service provider,

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or ISP could simply block, ultimately,
that website so that very few customers

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actually fall for that trick.

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Unfortunately, it turns
out that the web supports

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what are known as data URIs,
whereby this particular attack was

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linking not to a remote website,
but to a URL that looks like this.

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And notice, in particular,
it starts with data colon

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followed by a whole bunch of text.

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Well, it turns out, you
can embed in the URL bar

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of a browser enough information,
enough HTML, CSS, and even JavaScript,

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to make the page that's displayed
actually look like a Gmail log

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in screen, like this one here.

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And indeed, if you then type in
unwittingly your username, and perhaps

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even your password, and hit
enter, that username and password

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is sent to the bad guys website.

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Not, to the actual Gmail.

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Now, how does this work, and how
do these URI's actually function?

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Well, here's an example
of an actual data URI.

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And among the compelling
uses of these things

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is to embed images and other
assets inside of web pages

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without having to link the secondary
files that then have to be loaded,

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typically a bit more slowly.

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Notice that too begins with data colon,
specifying this is a data URI, or URL.

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Then it specifies what the type
of the file is that follows.

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In this case, it's an image
of type BMP, or bitmap.

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And then it specifies how it's
encoded, which in this case

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is not binary, not decimal, not
even hexadecimal, but base-64,

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which is a base system that uses
letters, both capital and lowercase, as

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well as numbers, as well as a couple
of other characters, to represent,

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as text, what might otherwise
just be zeros and ones, or binary.

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Now, the characters
that follow, while they

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look like purely alphabetical,
and syntactic characters

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are actually the base-64
encoding of an image.

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This image here.

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Now, let's enhance.

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And you might, indeed,
see a familiar face.

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That is literally the file
that's embedded in that data.

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And so with the bad guys
did in this Gmail attack

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is actually embed a functioning web
page that was base-64 encoded, instead

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of it being as simple as a
simple happy Smiley face.

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Now, thankfully, browsers
like Chrome can help

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us notice when websites are legitimate.

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Here I'm at accounts.google.com,
and it starts with HTTPS,

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and Chrome is telling me,
in green, that it's secure.

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As a result of this attack, and
others like it, has Google also

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added functionality to Chrome so that if
a user accidentally, or even knowingly

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visits a data URI, that
begins with data colon,

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now are users informed, a
little more clearly, in gray,

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that this website is not secure.

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And now it-- actually,
wait, this just in.

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I'm hearing from CS50's own
Doug Lloyd that there's actually

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a hacking attack in progress.

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For more on this, let's go to our
live feed of the hack in progress.

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[MUSIC PLAYING]

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And now, of course, no
discussion of security of late

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would be complete without
mention of our own CIA,

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or Central Intelligence Agency.

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Indeed, it was recently
revealed by Wikileaks.org

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that the CIA has been taking advantage
for some time of bugs in software

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in order to wage attacks
against owners of the hardware

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running that software, including popular
devices like Android phones, iPhones,

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TVs, and more.

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And in Vault 7 in particular did
Wikileaks reveal the CIA hacking tools.

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Specifically referring to
such initiatives by the CIA,

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seemingly adorable initiatives like,
Wrecking Crew, Crunchy Lime Skies,

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Elder Piggy, Anger Quake, or McNugget,
which indeed sound delightful.

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But when you actually read about what
these code names mean they actually

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refer to a systematic process
for identifying bugs in software,

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and therefore, potential
exploits, writing

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software that take advantage of
those bugs, so as, to effectively,

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hack into people's
software and/or hardware.

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And potentially affected are familiar
tools like Skype, our own WiFi

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networks, PDFs, anti-virus software.

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In addition to popular devices
like the very phones in our pocket.

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But, all too close to
home, frankly was the fact

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that Samsung TVs seem to be
the result, or the victim,

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of some of these very exploits.

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In fact, adorably, Weeping
Angel was the code name

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for a project that
took advantage of bugs

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in Samsung TV'S own software,
Smart TVs software, in order

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to turn on, without
customers, apparently knowing,

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those devices microphones so that
you could theoretically listen in

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on conversations, and even
record them, even while giving

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the appearance that the TV is off.

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So the user thinks the TV is
off, and he or she is talking.

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But meanwhile, that TV
is actually listening.

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Now, you may recall it
wasn't all that long ago

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that the CS50 itself blew the lid off of
another problem with Samsung Smart TVs,

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whereby at the time, though
they claimed and thought

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they were actually encrypting such
data, because these microphones are

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present so that you can talk to your
TV, and issue VoiceBase commands,

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will recall that data was
not actually being encrypted.

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Now, what is a Smart
TV in the first place?

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Well, at the end of the day, our
TVs are no longer just televisions.

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They are actually full fledged computers
with hardware and software within.

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And indeed, if you have such
a Smart TV, whether it's

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Samsung, or something else, you may very
well have icons like these on your TV,

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much like a tablet, or a phone.

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And that's because you can
install software on TVs today.

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But if you can install software
you can surely install accidentally

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buggy software, or unknowingly
exploitative software,

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that's actually doing something
it's not supposed to do.

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But even scarier is when our hardware
has things like these things here.

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Cameras and microphones
that are supposed

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to be used for good and not evil.

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As this man here is talking
to his TV and using Skype

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by talking into his remote control.

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That in fact is meant to be a feature.

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But when these things can be
turned on without our control,

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and when they can be turned on
even when we think they are off,

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therein lies the threat and the scare.

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Now, how do you know if you are
among those that were affected?

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And indeed, if you are suspicious
that the CIA is spying on you,

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how can you confirm as much?

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Well, if your Samsung TV was
manufactured in 2011 or 2012

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this particular attack is germane.

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However, to be fair, the attack requires
that the CIA tiptoe into your home,

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presumably, plug-in a USB
stick with the software,

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in order to take advantage of this bug.

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But if that too is a threat,
consider that the software

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your smart TV must be running
for this attack to work

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00:13:09,380 --> 00:13:13,102
is either version 1011, 1012, 1016.

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And there have been
newer versions since.

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But the biggest help, perhaps, is
if when you think your TV is off you

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actually still see a blue
LED light on in the back.

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It might actually be listening,
and god forbid, watching you.

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For more on this particular attack and
others, you can take a look at this URL

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here.

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That's it.

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For CS50 Live, thank you so much to
CS50's own Ian, and Andrew, Marinda,

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00:13:36,320 --> 00:13:41,960
Ramone, Skulli, Dan, Arturo, Christian,
and of course, CS50's own, Doug Lloyd.

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This was CS50.

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00:13:43,190 --> 00:13:46,490


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[WATER SPLASHING]

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[BIRD SQUAWKING]

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