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[MUSIC PLAYING]

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SPEAKER 1: One year ago, in this quiet
library, in this cozy studio, something

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happened, something so frightening--

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SPEAKER 2: Ah.

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SPEAKER 1: Something so deadly--

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something so evil-- we prayed
it would never happen again.

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SPEAKER 3: Ah.

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SPEAKER 1: Now from the creators
of CS50 Live comes CS50 Live.

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DAVID J. MALAN: Hello, world.

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This is CS50 Live,
season one, zero indexed.

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That's right.

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We've been picked up by
Harvard for another season.

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And boy do we have an amazing
episode for you today.

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First we'll take a look back at the most
popular passwords of this past year,

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we'll look at a nasty bug in
a popular gaming platform,

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we'll give you a new
definition of the word evil,

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and we'll pay a visit to
our friends at Google.

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No relation.

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But first, let's take a
look back at season one.

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[MUSIC PLAYING]

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Hello, world.

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This is--

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SPEAKER 5: CS--

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RAMON GALVAN: 50 Live.

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I'm Ramon Galvan, filling
in today for David--

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DAVID J. MALAN: Who's lost his voice.

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RAMON GALVAN: Today, he'll be the
Andy Richter to my Conan O'Brien.

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[MUSIC PLAYING]

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DAVID J. MALAN: And now
for our first bug fix.

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This is of course season zero's
look back and not season one.

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But what else is new?

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Well, it turns out not much
in the world of passwords.

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In fact, the most popular password of
this past year was as before 123456

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followed closely in second
place by old school, password.

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However, in third place this year,
up 17 places, is our old favorite

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12345, which you may remember
from such films as this one here.

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Now in 17th-- in 25th place, meanwhile,
is a newcomer, dragon, perhaps because

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of such films as this one.

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Now in 25th place--

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and now for our second
bug fix of the season.

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Whereas that was in ninth
place, dragon, we're

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now going to take a look
at 25th place, trustno1.

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Now if you think you've been oh so
clever by using one, the number,

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instead of one the
word in your password,

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well, rest assured that so
have millions of other people.

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Now you may recall this expression
from such films as this one here.

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And speaking of Scully, we'd
like to welcome aboard to CS50--

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CS50's newest team member, Scully,
pictured here at a recent field trip

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to a CS50 ice skating rink.

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In fact, can we enhance?

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No.

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Can we enhance?

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Yes, indeed.

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That is our Scully.

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Welcome aboard.

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And now a nasty bug
in a popular software

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from our friends at
Valve Software called

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Steam, which is a platform for
downloading and then playing

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popular video games.

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Well, turns out that a user recently
reported to the Linux community

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for Steam's client the following bug.

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He moved his local share
Steam directory, he ran Steam,

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and it deleted everything
on the system owned by user.

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In other words, simply by
moving one of his folders

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for this game, Steam-- for this platform
gaming-- for this gaming platform

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Steam, he ended up deleting all
of the files on his hard drive.

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Now what's fascinating, if you take
a look at this thread on github.com

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is you'll see that the community
chased down the bug to this line here,

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which declares a so-called
environment variable on the left,

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assigns it the value here on the right.

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But unfortunately, it
turns out if you do

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move a certain directory, this value
you can evaluate to just quote unquote,

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or the so-called empty string.

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Now unfortunately, later in the file
was this very dangerous line here.

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rm-rf and then STEAMROOT slash star.

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Unfortunately, if STEAMROOT
is itself the empty string,

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this becomes just slash star, which
of course, has the effect of saying,

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remove recursively and
forcibly everything

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in the root of my hard drive.

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Now thankfully, this particular
fellow had backups of all of his data.

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So not all was lost.

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But if you'd like to take a closer
look at this bug and the resulting fix

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therefore, go ahead
to GitHub's URL here.

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And now a word from
our old friend Cookie

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Monster, who's holding in
his hands here Verizon,

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who gives us today our new
definition of the word evil.

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You may recall a few months
back that Verizon, as well

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as another popular cell
phone company in the US,

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AT&T, were injecting so-called
super cookies into the mobile HTTP

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traffic from folks like me who are
using phones to access the internet.

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Specifically, they were
introducing into our HTTP traffic

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a header called UIDH, which essentially
inserted a unique value associated

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somehow to my cell phone and
perhaps your cell phone so

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that any website that receives that
value can know that this is me again,

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and again, and again.

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Of course, this
effectively allows websites

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to track me under the premise of
serving up more effective advertising,

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but nonetheless maliciously
potentially, keeping track of who I am.

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Because in fact, even if I
delete all of my phone's cookies

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and even if I use my
browser's Incognito Mode,

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this UIDH header is still being
injected by a company like Verizon.

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Now thankfully, Verizon
recently announced

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that they're going to
let us finally opt out

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of this horrible, horrible practice.

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And yet all along,
they've been assuring us

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the UIDH was designed with
privacy protections in place.

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It changes automatically
and frequently and does not

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contain any customer information.

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Now the last of those
claims might be true.

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But this is ridiculous to claim
that by changing it periodically

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and automatically, you're
actually protecting us users.

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Consider after all how
a malicious website

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can figure out who we still are.

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If this is me here on the left trying to
visit a website like this on the right,

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and suppose for the sake of discussion
that this website on the right

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happens to be running PHP, and
therefore uses session cookies,

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and gives me a value called
PHPSESSID to remember

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who I am as with one of
those digital hand stamps.

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Well, the next time I make an
HTTP request to the server,

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I'm going to present that hand stamp,
PHPSESSID, and it might equal ABCD.

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But meanwhile, Verizon, as a
so-called man in the middle,

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is going to be injecting a little
something like this, UIDH:1234,

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which is my unique identifier
so long as Verizon is concerned.

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Now so long as this
website remembers that,

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he can correlate of
course ABCD with 1234.

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But suppose the next time I visit the
website, I again send that same cookie,

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ABCD.

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But Verizon is now claiming
that they're protecting me

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by changing my value to say 5678.

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Well, it doesn't take a particularly
sophisticated line of code

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to realize ABCD used to be 1234.

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Now ABCD is 5678.

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Let me update my own database so
that I realize that 1234 and 5678 are

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and have always been the same person.

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It's not much protection indeed.

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Now for more details and to learn
more about these kinds of threats,

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head to this URL here.

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And if you'd like to be
paranoid, and you should now be,

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head to amibeingtracked.com.

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And now for a new segment altogether.

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You know that depictions
of technology are

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quite popular in today's films and TV.

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But they're not necessarily
always accurate.

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In fact, let's take a look at a popular
film from yesteryear, Weird Science,

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and pass a little CS50 judgment.

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Let's roll film.

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[VIDEO PLAYBACK]

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Here we have two fellas trying to hack
into a computer system using an age

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old modem by putting the
phone on top of the computer.

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This man is now defending
himself against the attack.

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If you've ever wondered what it
means to hack, this of course,

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is what it truly is.

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Those are some backup tapes.

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Yeah, access.

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That's what happens
when access is denied.

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Now wait for it.

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Wait for it.

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Bowling alley effect.

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And now we have to choose.

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How are we going to hack this?

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We're going to hack to the left.

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Yeah, no.

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That was the wrong choice.

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Let's try again.

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Back up.

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Let's go down the middle.

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Here we go.

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All right.

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Wait for it.

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Wait for it.

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I wonder what time it is.

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Oh.

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Oh, and physics, of course, is relevant.

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SPEAKER 6: We're in.

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[END PLAYBACK]

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DAVID J. MALAN: No.

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No.

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No.

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We're not in.

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That's enough of that.

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But if you'd like to learn a bit more
about this, Google Weird Science.

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And in fact, speaking
of Google, we recently

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headed out to Mountain View, California
to meet with two of our friends

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from Google to talk with them about
what it's like to develop software

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in the real world.

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In fact, we met with them
outside of the actual building

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in which Android software is developed.

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Let's take a look.

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ANDREW SELLERGREN: My story starts
senior year of college in 2007.

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I was a chemistry major and
planning to go to medical school.

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I signed up for CS50.

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This was the first year
that David was teaching.

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I loved it.

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I loved every minute of it.

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David was nice enough to invite me
back the next year to be a TF for CS50.

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I bounced around a
little bit after college.

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I didn't end up going to medical school.

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And I decided to teach myself
more about computer science.

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And I ended up getting a job at Google.

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And I'm now on the Android team.

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JOHN NICKERSON: Here at Google, I
work in the Anti-Abuse engineering

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department and our product quality
operations group, specifically

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fighting click fraud on our ad networks.

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ANDREW SELLERGREN: Recently,
I've been working on a website.

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And of course, at Google,
developing a website

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means you want to be able
to serve millions of users.

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So we have to get things
like load balancing in place.

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00:10:01,800 --> 00:10:06,170
We have to make sure that the static
content gets served very quickly

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00:10:06,170 --> 00:10:09,860
and is optimized for all of our users.

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00:10:09,860 --> 00:10:12,260
And in order to test this,
one of the things we do

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is we write integration tests.

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So we have to bring
up all of our servers,

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including the login servers, the static
content servers, bring those all up,

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and then test that our website loads.

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So we use a framework called
Selenium, which is open source.

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And it allows you to fire up a browser
and actually load your website in it,

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and then perform actions on it.

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The interesting challenges
are digging into those logs,

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figuring out what's going on.

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And that's what I've been wrestling
with the last week or so actually.

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JOHN NICKERSON: Ran into
an interesting problem

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where we were dependent
on date and time.

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And when you think about date
and time, you usually only

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think about your local system
because you're coding on it,

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and you compile on
it, and you run on it.

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But what happens is when
you're in a global--

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you have a global footprint with
data centers all over the world,

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local time doesn't really
mean anything anymore.

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So we realize that local time
was actually causing problems

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00:11:06,200 --> 00:11:11,460
because the database that all of our
data was stored in had a timestamp.

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00:11:11,460 --> 00:11:15,590
And so timestamps now were very timezone
dependent, which none of the code

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accounted for.

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And so what we ended up realizing
was that all of a sudden,

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00:11:19,160 --> 00:11:23,540
jobs were running that they thought
were running eight hours in the future

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were actually running presently.

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The end result was to
just normalize any time

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we're using date times to make sure
they're in either UTC timestamp

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so that we normalize the time,
or just double check to make sure

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that we're running in an environment
that is known at the time

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so that we don't run into these sorts
of weird math time calculation problems

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that we did.

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ANDREW SELLERGREN: Hello, world.

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I'm Andrew Sellergren.

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JOHN NICKERSON: And this is CS50.

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DAVID J. MALAN: And now
for a special treat.

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At Harvard, there's a
tradition of shopping

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for courses whereby students
can take a look at classes

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for the week at the
start of the semester

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before actually enrolling
in those classes.

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We thought we'd honor this tradition
by producing CS50's first ever music

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video toward an end of
getting students and hopefully

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you excited about what awaits in CS50.

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This is "Funk 50".

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SPEAKER 7: Do.

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Do, do, do, do, do, do.

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Do, do.

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Do, do, do, do, do, do, do, do.

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Do, do, do, do, do, do, do, do.

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Do, do, do, do, do.

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SPEAKER 8: Learn C that good code,
JavaScript for that net gold.

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This one for them undergrads, them
hackers, straight coding beasts.

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Typing, while I'm compiling it on stage.

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Got hoodies on with Rob Bowden.

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Got to go with CS50.

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We can't stop.

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SPEAKER 9: Oh yeah.

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SPEAKER 8: Called a
crimson and a bulldog.

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Code a lot.

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SPEAKER 9: Oh yeah.

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SPEAKER 8: Make Zuck
want to come back again.

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We can't stop.

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SPEAKER 9: Oh yeah.

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SPEAKER 8: What a
name, that Harvard man.

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Why not?

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SPEAKER 9: Oh yeah.

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Am I good about that fair.

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Break it down.

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Course is your hallelujah.

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Puzzles be coming to you.

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Course is your hallelujah.

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Because these Malan
going to teach it to you.

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Because your TF going
to teach it to you.

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Because you for sure
going to learn it to you.

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Thursday night and we in the Berg.

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Don't believe me, just shop.

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Don't believe me, just shop.

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Don't believe me, just shop.

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Don't believe me, just shop.

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Don't believe me just shop.

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Don't believe me just shop.

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Hey, hey, hey, oh.

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CS50 what?

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Come on, code it up.

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CS50, what?

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Come on, code it up.

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CS50, what?

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Come on, code it up.

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CS50 what?

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DAVID J. MALAN: That's it for CS50 Live.

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Thanks so much to Oleg,
and Joe, and Patrick,

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and to Dan, Shelly, Colton, Ramon,
and our newest team member, Scully.

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This was CS50.

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[MUSIC PLAYING]

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